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Abstract
Quantifying the processes of coping is one way to make the concept both descriptive and
testable. Decisional Control (DC) is a formal, mathematically-specified, normative model
which prescribes that an individual faced with a variety of alternatives in a stressing situation
will attempt to minimize objective and perceived threat of an adverse event inherent within
their choices. In this study, a game-theoretic probability mixture model created for DC was
evaluated using established indexes of model fit to empirical decision and choice data.
Sources of empirical departure from the fully normative model predictions, notably
individual and group cognitive mapping of choice linked threat, were investigated in part
through the use of psychometrical profiling of individual differences. Results of a repeated
measures ANOVA showed that individualized mappings of subjective threat significantly
improved model fit over that of the consensual and objective mappings. Additionally,
psychometric profiling did not identify notable trends in model operation.
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Chapter 1: Decisional Control: A Normative Model of Coping with Stress
1.1 Introduction
Coping with stress is a universal experience and one which requires a complex
interplay of cognitive functions. Coping with stress can be done in a variety of ways, but
choice is key in determining how an individual will respond (Averill, 1973; Thompson,
1981). Through behavioural, cognitive and decisional means, choice in stressful
situations offers an advantage of accessing less-threatening alternatives and greater
control of reducing stress reactions (Averill, 1973). Dissecting how individuals judge
alternatives, when faced with a host of aversive events of varying degrees of
undesirability or harm, and exert personal control to minimize the anticipated stress can
increase our understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of stress. To understand the
role of coping and stress reduction, arguably we must first discuss how a decision maker
(DM) formulates a choice (Thompson, 1981).
Beginning with a discussion of normative decision theory, accepted theories and
their relevance to our model will be introduced. Particularly, the distinction between
normative and descriptive models in decision research will be elucidated. Following this,
a normative model of Decisional Control (DC) will be presented in detail along with its
underlying game-theoretic architecture. Finally, planned model testing and fit will be
discussed as it pertains to necessity testing. When speaking of necessity testing, a
distinction from sufficiency testing is needed. The primary goal of the present study is to
explore sources of differential conformity between our collected data and the theoretical
predictions posited by our formal normative model. While a secondary aim of this
research is to understand how psychometric correlates may relate to the operation of the
model, the primary interest lies in examining sources of improved fit (necessity testing).
Such sources include the historical distinction between objective and subjective
properties of stressor processes at an individual and group level (Heukelom, 2008;
Rappaport, 1983). Specifically, I examine if there is conformity or departure from
objective utilities imposed by the environment and whether improved model fit is
observed when taking into account the representation of the environment by the
individual (subjective utilities; elaborated on below). Lastly, the aim is not to see whether
the model does so (leaving a non-significant empirical departure from model predictions)
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sufficiently or to improve model fit, but to examine tendered sources of improved
empirical fit to predictions.
1.2 Normative Decision Theory
Beginning in the 1950s, cognitive psychologists began focusing on two questions:
how do people make decisions and how should decisions be made (Edwards & Fasolo,
2001). While related, the two questions frame decision-making in two separate ways. The
first is concerned with what choice is made (the final result of a decision), while the latter
incorporates notions about a DM’s use of cognitive mechanisms in explaining how the
decision is reached.
The second question is also concerned with the final result, but in this instance the
process involved in making the decision becomes the focus. A driving force behind this
area of research stemmed from a pursuit to improve decision-making ability through
understanding how individuals judge between alternatives (Edwards & Fasolo, 2001). In
order to separate the two concepts, the terms normative and descriptive were applied to
decision-making theories.
In a descriptive theory, the source of interest is how people make decisions. These
theories are descriptive of the process (from presentation of a dilemma to the choice
made). Theories concerned with how a decision should be made are referred to as
normative. The emphasis of normative theories rests on understanding or explaining how
a DM incorporates environmental demands and intellectual tools available to help make
the best possible decision. The idea that a best option exists and that it should be the goal
of a decision is prescribed by a normative approach. In short, a normative model could be
viewed as one with a hypothesized arsenal of cognitive tools used to estimate and
incorporate environmental demands in the process of making a decision. On the other
hand, a descriptive model expresses how the underlying arsenal is actually appropriated
to lead to a decision. It does not attempt to explain which components of the arsenal exist
or how they function together to lead to the decision made.
To identify and quantify the “best” choice under a normative theory, cognitive
psychologists interested in decision-making rely on mathematics and three specific rules
which encompass normative decision theory (Edwards & Fasolo, 2001). The three rules
are multi-attribute utility (MAU) measurement, Bayes’ theorem of probability theory
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(hereafter referred to as Bayes), and maximization of expected utility (Max EU). Each
rule will be discussed in turn to an extent that is relevant for understanding its role in the
present research.
1.2.1 Multi-attribute utility (MAU).
In order for an individual to make a decision there must be a choice between two
or more options. Generating the list of available options can be cognitively taxing as the
number of options available to the DM grows. Sometimes the list of options is exhaustive
and fully specifies directly what outcomes occur when selected (e.g., in a quantitative
closed form solution). An example of this could be choosing what to eat at a restaurant.
When you order something off the menu, that selection will be what you receive.
Commonly, what occurs instead is that events beyond the DM’s control combine with the
options available to determine what outcome occurs. An example of this second case
could be choosing which route to take home from work and its impact on your trip time.
You might choose to take the highway instead of a variety of side-streets, find it
unfortunately deadlocked (an event beyond your control), resulting in a very long and
unexpected commute.
In normative decision theory, the options available are called “acts” and the
events beyond the DM’s control are referred to as “states” of the environment. An
important element of states is that they are considered mutually exclusive and exhaustive
of one another; states and state selection have no effect or relation to other non-selected
states. In order for a DM to make a choice, the outcomes comprised of acts and states
require some sort of comparable value relative to one another. To be measurable and
comparable, they must all share the same measurement scale. However, all assessments
of value are entirely subjective of the DM and can vary from one individual to the next.
In this respect, all outcomes are considered subjectively different and are referred to as
“utilities” in normative decision theory. MAU is the process of aggregating utilities to
create an overall subjective score for choice comparison.
However, subjective utilities are not always the only type of utility present.
Sometimes there can be objective utilities; utilities which possess the true ranks of
outcomes. For example, someone might subjectively appraise their choice of braking at a
yellow light as less likely to lead to an accident than choosing to go through the
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intersection. Objectively this may be false if statistics quantitatively illustrate that it is
three times more likely that an accident will occur if they choose to brake. Problems can
arise in real world scenarios like this and have consequences for the DM. In this case, a
normative model would subscribe to the best objective utility to choose (going through
the yellow light), but a descriptive model might find that selection is made using a
subjective utility evaluated highest by the DM (braking at the yellow light). To
investigate which conditions are operant under the normative model, subjective and
objective utilities must be considered and compared (Heukelom, 2008; Rappaport, 1983).
More on this topic will follow in subsequent sections on model testing and fit.
1.2.2 Bayes’ theorem of probability theory.
In addition to subjectively evaluating utilities, most decisions have a degree of
uncertainty to them. Decisions may lead to one or more outcomes beyond the DM’s
control. However, DMs often have varying degrees of information about the possibility
of one outcome or the other. This information permits judging of the probabilities of the
outcomes related to that choice, such as in instances where Bayes’ theorem can be
implemented. Bayes’ theorem assists in choice selection by incorporating prior evidence
to help in assessing the probability of a particular outcome (Bayes & Price, 1763). DMs
use this process known as “fallible inference” or “inference under uncertainty” (Edwards
& Fasolo, 2001) to make judgements regarding which outcomes are likely to occur for
any given act under a particular state. Using our above traffic example, if the DM had
been rear-ended multiple times when choosing to brake at a yellow light, they may have
updated their belief to now believe that going through the intersection is best. The prior
information that they bring into the decision influences their beliefs and, in this case, their
subjective utility aligns with the objective utility. However, if the DM had never been
rear-ended braking at an intersection and had done so hundreds of times, they may hold
an incorrect belief that their subjective utility is the best choice. Even when additional
information is introduced, such as explaining that statistics show it is less optimal to
break at the light, it is possible the DM may hold their subjective utility higher still.
Further exploration of this and similar concepts is beyond the scope of this present
research and related to psychological heuristics (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).
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Relevant to this study is the notion that judging between utilities does rely on prior
learned, experienced, or provided knowledge.
1.2.3 Maximization of expected utility (Max EU).
Combining aggregates of relevant utilities and probabilities leads us to a
quantitative basis upon which acts can be ranked by DMs. As both utilities and
probabilities are subjectively determined by DMs, normative decision theory refers to the
aggregates of both as “subjectively expected utilities” (SEUs). Max EU is the process of
maximizing the desired outcome by selecting the act with the largest SEU value.
Specifically, the last rule dictates choosing the act with the highest utility when outcomes
contain no uncertainty and choosing the act with the highest SEU when uncertainty is
present (Edwards and Fasolo, 2001).
While this normative theory is a large oversimplification for generating a
decision, as undoubtedly a number of cognitive processes are present in each step of the
process, it acts as a good referent for the present work. A very thorough review of the
literature can be found in Edwards, Miles, and Von Winterfeldt (2007) and Von
Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986). It should be evident, however, that through the
exploration of these three rules, the process by which individual DMs come to make a
decision is largely subjective and can require the use of a variety of cognitive processes.
Particular individuals may favor careful selection of acts, desiring a large amount of
information prior to choosing one, while others may be more resigned to have a selection
delegated to them. Two decision-making strategies related to these sorts of differing
approaches are maximization and satisficing. In maximization, a DM exhaustively
considers all acts in order to find the one with the best utility, whereas a DM adopting a
satisficing strategy will evaluate acts until they find one that is suitable (Simon, 1956).
Choosing a satisficing strategy does not disqualify the possibility that the DM was able to
apply the three rules of normal decision theory, but decided the effort was not justified to
exhaustively search for the objectively best utility. Nor does choosing a maximizing
strategy assume that the DM will choose the objectively best utility, as their subjective
utilities or their application of the three rules may be flawed. Clearly decision-making is
an individualized process likely informed by a variety of dispositional factors. So too is
the act of coping to reduce stress.
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1.3 Decisional Control
DC is a method of coping with stress in which the DM positions oneself in a
stressor situation so as to avoid situational components harboring higher probabilities of
threat (Lees & Neufeld, 1999, p. 185). The underlying assumption is that a DM, when
faced with a selection of varying levels of subjectively adverse events (acts), will make
probabilistic judgements (arguably a cognitively-intensive process) about the threat
inherent in each situation (states). The DM then makes a choice to pursue the act they
believe has the lowest level of stress associated and best chance for a favorable outcome.
Notably, this normative model is well positioned in normative decisional theory and
follows the three rules discussed earlier.
As normative models make use of mathematics to discern MAX EU, it is
facilitative to start with a practical example that explores the environmental framework
and begin introducing some of the equations used in the DC model.
1.4 Environmental Framework of Decisional Control
Stress can range in severity (from benign to behaviorally and/or cognitively
paralyzing) and can be evoked by a number of different scenarios (from adverse social
events to situations with a chance for severe discomfort or physical harm). Many real-life
scenarios can be drawn on to construct elements in a game-theoretic infrastructure
composed of stressful alternatives. According to Rasmusen (2007), a game-theoretic
infrastructure is one in which the following four elements must be present: a player (or
players), information and actions available at each decision point, and the payoff for each
outcome. Routed in game theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstem, 2004), well-defined
mathematical objects are structured in nested hierarchies (decision trees) with each node
representing a choice the player (DM) can make, each branch attached to a node
representing an action, and each leaf following an action representing a payoff
(Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). As will be illustrated in the example to follow, a gametheoretic infrastructure can be constructed to model and test our normative model of DC.
For a real-world example, imagine that you have been invited to two separate social
gatherings on the same day in similar venues. Each has the same number of guests, but
varies in the people attending. At both gatherings, there are people with whom you are
not particularly fond of interacting. As an introvert, the thought of attending either event
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may prove stressful, but you have decided to at least talk to the person seated beside you
at your assigned table. For simplicity’s sake, we will assume there are four people at each
gathering (each one at a separate table) with whom you are particularly averse to having
to interact with. You predict the conversation will probably lead to adverse social
interaction (e.g., a strong differing of opinions). These eight individuals could be ranked
ordered from 1 to 8 (t1, t2, …, t8; t representing threat of an adverse stress-inducing event;
an act). There is a discernably increasing probability that a conversation will result in an
adverse social event (t8 being the highest probability, and t1 being the lowest).
This example takes the form of a nesting-nested hierarchy in which the DM
potentially engages one discrete (mutually exclusive) entity within a tier. The social
gathering and the adverse interactions make up the architecture of our two-tier design
(with parameters p and q; where p = the number of social gatherings = 2 and q = the
number of eligible interactants within each = 4). This architecture is substantiated in
Figure 1.

Bin level
p=2

Element level
q=4

Social Gathering 2

Social Gathering 1

t4

t7

t3

t6

t2

t1

t8

t5

Figure 1. An example of a nesting-nested hierarchy (decision tree) with ti
elements randomized at the most subordinate level. Nodes are located along
horizontal lines, with two at the bin level and four within each bin (eight total). In this
example, ti elements are illustrated as static, but would be randomly ordered each
time the hierarchy is displayed. The two bin groups have been coloured differently
for illustrative purposes; to make it easier to follow the nesting hierarchy.

As in life, control over which entity (node) is engaged is not always within the
DM’s control. DC can sometimes only be applied at certain tiers or not at all. In this
model C is used to represent the scenario structure in which the DM has an unfettered
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choice (they have predictive information and decision-making power); N to represent
external assignment with information but no decision-making power; and U to represent
external assignment in which the DM has no information or decision-making power. To
capture the essence of conditions U and N, their assignment is random from available
options. In this way the elements are neither predictable or controllable for U or
controllable for N.
Considering this two-tiered example (Figure 1), DC can succinctly be expressed
in sentential logic. The definition of DC for a two-tiered hierarchy is
∃ J = {x1, x2} ∋ ∀ xi ∈ J, xi = C ⊻ (U ⊻ N),

(1)

where x1,2 denote the DC conditions for the upper and lower tiers, respectively (Neufeld,
Shanahan, & Nguyen, 2014; Shanahan, Nguyen & Neufeld, manuscript in revision). Put
simply, at each level of the two-tiered hierarchy, either a C, U, or N can be a presenting
condition to be engaged by the DM. The total number of combinations form a set of J; in
our example there are nine pairs, as ordered on the first and second tier (CC, CN, CU,
NC, NN, NU, UC, UN, and UU). Any individual combination is further referred to as j in
the set of J. Keeping with our example, in an instance of CU, the DM would be able to
choose which party to attend but have no information about who is attending (the ti’s
nested within each party) nor any choice of which of the four people they will be required
to sit beside. Alternatively, in NC, the DM will know which party they are attending
(perhaps they were forced into attending one gathering by that gathering’s hostess;
information but no control in the gathering selection). In this scenario, however, they are
told by the host the table at which each of the four people attending will be sat and the
DM is given the choice of the table at which they would like to sit (information about
which 4 individuals are attending and party-wise control).
In addition, each of the pq elements of the two-tiered hierarchy, has an unique
appraised probability of adverse-event occurrence ti (Shanahan & Neufeld, 2010) of
{t1<t2< …<ti< …tpq}; tj<ti iff j<i ; ti ∈ [0,1].

(2)

As denoted in Equation 2, the threatened event is a Bernoulli outcome (either it
happened/was encountered, 1, or not, 0) and t is the probability of its occurrence. In
essence, and as stated in Equation 2, there are a number of possible levels of threat (i.e. t1
through t8, with probability of engaging any ti denoted Pr[ti]) for the DM which get
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discernibly worse. As these discrete amounts are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, only
one level of threat (e.g., a gauche interchange is the occurring outcome; ti is the
probability of its occurrence) will transpire and the probability of it occurring Pr(ti) is
related to the level of expected threat, E(t), expressed as
= E(t)

pq
.
(3)

Each of these ti values is randomly dispersed over the pq elements and can be engaged
with different probabilities based on the conditions of control available to the DM.
Assuming that stressor-event magnitude is such that those with higher ti values are
avoided to a greater extent (thus yielding lower probabilities), we can assume that when
choice is given to the DM they will select options in favor of achieving the smallest ti
value available (referred to before as a maximizing or maximax strategy; Janis & Mann,
1977; Morrison, Neufeld, & Lefebvre, 1988; Rappaport, 1983). Given CC, it is assumed
that the DM will always select t1 upon making the appropriate number of cognitive
appraisals required to discern the decisions necessary in reaching it. In our example, this
requires only two operations of DC – to select the social gathering (bin) that contains t1
and then select to sit at the table (element) with the individual representing t1.
Using basic combinatorics, a potentially helpful way of visualizing the above
engagement and probabilities is through a visual example using bin or urn terminology.
Imagine transparent bins labelled t1 through t8, each containing an equal number of balls,
some black and some white. The black balls represent an adverse event and the white
balls represent a null event (a non-stressful event). If we say there are 8 balls in each bin,
then the t1 bin might have 1 black ball and 7 white balls and the t8 bin might have 7 black
balls and 1 white ball. These balls represent a Bernoulli outcome (there are only two
possibilities), but the probabilities of drawing either a white ball or a black ball vary
based on the bin. Further, the probability of accessing different bins varies based on the
conditions of control (the choice-scenario architecture). The DM will attempt to always
reach the t1 bin (if available), as the probability that they will draw a black ball (encounter
an adverse event) is minimal. In this way, the probability of drawing a black ball is nested
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within the probability of engaging a particular bin. If we relate this back to our example
depicted in Figure 1: if you happen to find yourself in a CU condition, a
maximizing/maximax strategy would dictate you would choose to engage in social
gathering 2 in hopes of being assigned to table 1 (where the person represented by t1 is
present). If you happen to be assigned to table 5 (t5) instead due to the uncertainty (U) at
this level, it is still possible that your interchange with the person who you do not like at
that table will not result in an unpleasant experience (i.e., experience a null event;
although probabilistically you are more likely to experience an adverse event).
In scenarios where p and q are larger than in the above example (i.e. when there are more
nested hierarchies, more elements within each, and a mixture of decisional-control
conditions), there is a greater information processing demand on the DM (Shanahan,
Pawluk, Hong, & Neufeld, 2012). This can be a source of stress in and of itself; one
which must be balanced with the stress of the adverse events. This relationship is

Adverse-Event
Threat

Cognitive-Workload
Investment

Cognitive-Workload Stress

Adverse-Event-Threat Stress

graphically represented in Figure 2.

Situational Opportunities for Decisional Control

Figure 2. A simplified graphical representation of the hypothetical relationship between
cognitive processing and the probability of experiencing an adverse-event.
As cognitive processing (and associated stress) increases, with increased potential
outcome-set size, so does the probability of engaging the lowest-tier element (ti).
Alternatively, as cognitive processing is reduced (with the inclusion of more N
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conditions), the stress related to cognition decreases but the probability of engaging in a
higher-tier element increases. This reciprocal relationship between predictive judgement
investment (cognitive workload or “challenge”) stress and exogenous-event threat stress
is what is known in decisional science as an “incompatibility of criteria” (Tversky,
1972a; Tversky, 1972b). Individual differences in coping strategies may be influenced by
this dynamic interplay of sources of stress. Some individuals may prefer to adopt a
maximizing/maximax strategy in order to make the “best decisions” in their pursuit of
minimal ti, whereas other’s may be willing to tolerate ti values below t5 (for example) if it
requires less cognitive workload (weighing choices; an example of adopting a satisficing
strategy). Different susceptibilities to one form of stress or the other, as they interface
with prevailing DC conditions, represent person-environment fit examined here.
In defining a situation amenable to our above example, certain notation is used to
specify the combination of p and q parameters (the number of elements at the first and
second tiers of the DC architecture) and the pair of choice conditions from among C, U,
and N that were present (one at each tier). Typically, the encounter is denoted “Z DC
combination; pq”,

so in the example of CU we would report that this encounter took the form

of ZCU; 2,4. Let us revisit the NC example, but this time combine it with Figure 1. If we
assume that the DM was forced into attending social gathering 1 by that event’s host
(condition N, meaning an assigned element from the p elements composing the top tier,
the assignment being disclosed at the outset). Next, they are made aware of the location
of the four guests attending that could result in adverse social exchanges (and associated
stress) and are able to choose which one to sit beside (C, meaning choice applied to the q
elements of the lower tier). From Figure 1, we see that the DM can only choose from t3,
t4, t6, and t7. We assume that they will likely choose t3 as it is the act with the lowest
probability for an adverse stressful encounter. If this scenario were run a few times, the
number of times each ti value was engaged would be reported as nti. Since N is randomly
selected each time and there is a p of 2; one would expect that social gathering 1 and 2
would be assigned an equal amount of times. Since t1 is eligible for selection at social
gathering 2, one would predict, that if the scenario of ZNC; 2,4 was run 10 times, that nt1=5
and some combination of tis other than t1 = 5 (as the ti are shuffled each encounter; unlike
the static Figure 1). Thus we would expect the probability of engaging t1 would be .50
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(Pr(t1) = 1/p). In fact, all the probabilities for ti can be readily computed for any twotiered encounter using the formulas located in Appendix A (Neufeld, 1999; Shanahan,
2016; Shanahan & Neufeld, 2010). Some probabilities require combinatorics, based on
whether t1 is able to be engaged by the DM. Upon further investigation of each, we can
see that certain combinations of conditional control are favorable to others (based on their
probabilities of achieving t1 and expectation of threat E[t], which again entails Pr[ti]ti
from Equation 3). It is important to note that C must be present at one level in the
scenario for DC to be available at all and that U at a subordinate level increases E(t)
significantly more than when it is positioned at the upper level (Shanahan et al., 2012;
Shanahan & Neufeld, 2010). Putting all of these elements together, it should be selfevident that we have created a game-theoretic paradigm susceptible to testing. Each
participant assumes the role of the DM, they are given differing levels of information and
action at each node, and they are aware of (or learn) the differing payoffs (ti values)
related to each outcome. Unique to this DC normative model is the use of stochastic
outcomes (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). By integrating stochastic outcomes, the
environment has an active role in deciding the DM’s fate. This can be observed in
conditions where control is not present, such as when a node is either an N or U
condition. The environment either withholds information and choice or choice alone and
assigns the DM a random action. We have a normative framework (the architecture)
upon which we can test if participants conform to our predictions.
1.5 Mixture Modelling
By fitting choices to a quantitative framework, we can disentangle the interplay of
different cognitive processes involved when judging environmental stressors. Through
the individual differences people display in similarly defined situations, we create a
normative model representing person-environment fit. Captured quantitatively, these
differences can illustrate differential dispositions towards engaging in presented
opportunities for choice (a descriptive model), which we can test against our normative
model of predicted probabilities (afforded by our closed-form equational system). As
coping strategies (and their underlying cognitive processes) are largely unique,
individuals will vary in their task performance in situations amenable to DC. At the same
time, in order to generalize our findings, we are interested in considering how well our
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model of DC performs with respect to a consensual, group-extracted, cognitive mapping.
As such, three separate models are required; a normative model (based on conditions
inherent in the environment), an individualized model (based on subjective appraisals of
the environment), and a group model (based on the averaged subjective appraisals across
the group).
One of the first requirements in setting up a mixture model is defining parameters.
Parameter estimation normally requires random sampling from a particular conjugate (i.e.
mathematically tractable) prior distribution that models the probability distribution of the
parameters (i.e. rate or probability) we are looking for. One advantage of our particular
setup is that we do not have to do this. We have our own discrete probabilities generated
from the ground up by our DC architecture. The base-distribution parameters which
pertain to the decision process itself are defined (ti values) and are subject to a probability
mixture, whose finite discrete probability mixing parameters are Pr(ti). We have already
discussed the hyper-parameters above which help define the base-distribution; they are C,
U, N and p and q. As we have already set up all of the architectures, including forming all
our combinations (j) in our set (J) and their resultant probabilities (probability of base
distribution parameter, Pr(ti)). As such, we already have what we need to form
multinomial likelihood functions involved in model testing. We are at an advantage
having created a closed form solution, as we are able to generate every single discrete
value. This can be likened to “samples” and “populations” in classical statistics.
Typically, one samples from a population to generate a representative group upon which
generalizations can be formed. In our case, we have the population of explicitly defined
values and do not need to sample. In order to validate the model using quantitative
predictions, engagements of particular ti and their related stochastically distributed ti,
whose Pr(ti) values are governed by the prevailing structure (j), are used to create
multinomial likelihoods.
1.6 Model Testing and Fit
The multinomial likelihood (ML) of nti (the number of times each ti value was
engaged) is defined similarly to how an encounter (Z DC combination; pq) was defined; ML DC
combination; pq

(in our previously discussed example for CU it would be illustratively

represented by ML CU; 2,4) and is represented by (Shanahan et al., manuscript in revision)
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(4)

In Equation 4, ZC,U,N; pq is the total number of times a particular encounter was
experienced, i.e. Nti is the number of ti engagements within that encounter, and Pr(ti) is
the model stipulated probability of engaging a particular ti within that encounter. Further,
the prior probabilities of each of j combinations, πj, within the J set of decisional
structures can be represented by the combined multinomial likelihood (Shanahan et al.,
manuscript in revision)

(5)

For the two-tiered DC structures, there are 9 unique combinations (j) possible within the
set of J. These unique structures are made of C, U, and N at the bin level, factorially
combined with C, U and N at the bin-element level (the J structure-combinations of j are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive; the πj sum to 1). Upon calculating a combined
multinomial likelihood for each participant, we will have the necessary values of the
descriptive model upon which to compare the theoretical predictions of our normative
model. In short, we will compare our generated normative predictions to the descriptive,
observed participant responding and determine how different element engagements (ti)
selectively conform to predictions from the prevailing j combinations (Shanahan et al.,
manuscript in revision). If we consider the prior case and apply our static CU example,
we would expect our participants to always select social gathering 2 (in attempt to
achieve t1). Due to the U nature of q, we would expect t1, t2, t5, and t8 to be engaged an
equal number of times (1/q = 1/4).
When we speak about model fit in the present case, we are referring to how well
the normative model-generated expected frequencies correspond to the actual observed
frequencies of participants (the descriptive model). Here, we would want to see if
participants, presented with a computer simulation representing the J combinations
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possible within our Figure 1 example, would show an almost identical pattern of nti as we
would predict from our model assumptions. This equivalence is tested using the
likelihood ratio chi-square statistic G2. As no parameter estimates were necessary (due to
our architecture, as mentioned above), both Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria
(which are both used to adjust G2 based on the number of parameters being estimated) are
not applied. As such, G2 is simply equal to -2 ln multiplied by the likelihood ratio.
To estimate fit of the different descriptive models (Group model and
Individualized model), we take the participant generated data and test its fit with our DCtendered model’s fit (Shanahan et al., 2012). To compute G2, a generic saturated model is
required to form the denominator of a likelihood ratio. In the latter case, the DC
predictions are replaced with observed engagements; instead of the probability of ti, the
actual number of ti engagements out of the total number of encounters are used. The
generic descriptive model is used as a normalizing factor to create a G2 value. This is
illustrated as
Likelihood Function DC model

G2 = - 2 ln (
Likelihood Function

generic saturated model

)

= - 2 ln (Likelihood Ratio)

(6)

≈ χ2, when n is large.
In contrast to our DC model used in the numerator, the generic, saturated model used in
the denominator replaces model predictions with observed proportions of ti selections
(Riefer & Batchelder, 1988). Additionally, to compliment the G2 value, a Pearson χ2
value (Cohen, 1988, Chapter 7) will also be computed as the two converge with a large
number of observations.
Based on results from a small simulation, the model of DC does perform as well
as the generic saturated model (Shanahan et al., manuscript in revision). If our predictions
and observations are close, we would expect a very good (low) G2 and Pearson χ2 value
for our tendered models, indicating their ability to accurately predict empirical
probabilities of responding. This serves as an estimate of model fit, whose sources of
change and whose psychometric correlates are the subject of the current thesis.
In order to quantify and empirically test this environmental framework of DC and
explore individual differences in responding, behavioral (e.g., choice selection and their
latencies), psychophysiological (e.g., heart rate, skin conductance) and subjective
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measures (e.g., verbal reports, numerical ratings) of stress are collected. Past research has
supported the use of these empirical measures quantifying DC composition (Shanahan &
Neufeld, 2010). Gathered empirically, the complex interplay of the above indicators of
stress can be disentangled to reveal differential dispositions in situational engagement
and should conform to predictions of fluctuating levels of stress created by the
environmental framework at both the group and individual level. However, the focus of
the present thesis squarely is on sources of model fit. Other collected responses, including
psychophysiological data, response times, and indices of stress generation will be
analyzed in the future.
Psychometric measures selected to explore individual differences in sources of
model fit include the Desirability of Control (DOC; Burger & Cooper, 1979), Need for
Cognition (NFC; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao 1982), Intolerance of Uncertainty (IOC;
Freeston, Rheaume, Letart, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994) Uncertainty Tolerance Scale
(UTS; Dalbert, 1996), the General Decision-Making Style questionnaire (GDMS; Scott &
Bruce, 1995) and the Endler Multidimensional Anxiety Scale’s Trait scale (EMAS-T;
Endler, Parker, Bagby, & Cox, 1991). Selection of measures was informed by previous
DC research or exploratory in nature. Elaboration of the measures is provided within the
methods section.
1.7 Aim of Current Research
Thus, one aim of the present study is to implement a game-theoretic infrastructure
upon which a probability mixture model can be built and tested using a normal
population (undergraduate students). This infrastructure/environmental framework will
allow the development of precise likelihoods of stress-relevant events and the ability to
test the model at both an individual and group level (Shanahan et al., manuscript in
revision). By implementing a self-contained model of DC, we can not only determine the
probabilities of how individuals within a DC amenable scenario should respond
(objective utility), but also use those computations to test our model (a combination of
top-down and bottom up approaches to validation). Candidate sources of departure from
the normative model (contingent/conditional-probability-based) predictions, notably
departures in the form of individual and group cognitive mapping of ti (subjective
utilities) and decision-making strategies, can enter into comparisons with normative
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model prescribed values (objective utilities and maximizing/maximax selection strategy)
and be correlated with psychometrics. This correlation encompasses the second aim of
the present research. Doing so will allow for estimation of ti values, to which the
maximizing/maximax-strategy component of the normative model potentially applies,
and also residual departure subsequent to allowing for individualized ti estimation.
In summary, the intended purposes of this study are two-fold: a) to test the normative
game-theoretic probability mixture model created for DC and b) to investigate sources of
departure from the normative model including through the use of psychometrically
profiling individual differences in DC “aptitude” (amenability).
The resultant model-based findings will provide empirical evidence that identifies
previously untapped model-testing predictions, including choice-selection behavior and
multinomial likelihood and Pearson χ2 implementation of DC. If the DC normative model
predictions align with empirical observations, the model could be adapted for use in
future studies with clinical populations with known cognitive and decisional difficulties.
This could allow theoretical and empirical exploration and interpretation of group
differences in navigating stressful situations, which could increase our knowledge of
aberrant or dysfunctional cognition leading to suboptimal, cognition dependant coping
strategies in clinical populations.
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Chapter 2: Methodology
2.1 Participants
Participants were recruited from Western University’s undergraduate Psychology
Research Participation Pool as partial fulfilment of course credit. Fifty-eight participants
were recruited and tested. Twelve participants were removed as a result of a significant
change in the paradigm (n = 8), a computer hard drive failing mid-experiment (n = 2), or
a lack compliance to the task/poor motivation (n = 2). The final participant sample
consisted of 20 males (Age M = 18.2, S.D. = 0.52, Min = 17, Max = 19, Mode = 18, and
Mdn = 18) and 26 females (Age M = 18.7, S.D. = 1.25, Min = 17, Max = 21, Mode = 18,
and Mdn = 18).
2.2 Inclusion Criteria
In order to participate in the present study, individuals needed to be under 30
years of age, right-handed, and self-reported good English reading comprehension. Age is
positively correlated with diminished electrodermal activity (Boucsein, 2006), with
noticeable age-related skin changes posited to influence electrodermal activity beginning
at 30 years of age (Boucsein, 2006). The criteria for age was due to this phenomena, as
psychophysiological data was collected for future analysis and not as part of the present
thesis.
2.3 Exclusion Criteria
The presence of a self-reported hearing problem is this study’s only exclusion
criteria.
2.4 Apparatus
Equipment used for data collection consisted of three separate hardware
platforms, one for cognitive, psychometric, and psychophysiological collection.
2.4.1 Cognitive research platform.
Cognitive data collection occurred on an internet-disabled desktop computer with
Windows 7 operating system. The participant and computer were in a room separated
from the experimenter by a one-way mirror. The participant was positioned so the
experimenter could observe the participant’s behavior, including the participant’s
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attention to the task, any discomfort with the adverse noise, choice selections, and time
spent on instructions. A bell located on the participant’s desk was used to signal task
completion or request assistance. Presentation of stimuli and collection of behavioral
responses were completed on the computer using behavioral experiment software (EPrime 2.0). Additional responding related to the learning paradigm was collected on
paper forms.
2.4.2 Psychometric research platform.
The Measures phase occurred in the data collection area of the research laboratory
using an internet-enabled Gateway laptop running Windows 7. Paper-based
questionnaires were transferred to an online survey software platform (Qualtrics TM), and
this software was used to administer questionnaires electronically.
2.4.3 Psychophysiological apparatus.
Psychophysiological data was collected using equipment manufactured by Biopac
(BIOPAC Systems, Inc., Goleta, CA). The MP-150 Data Acquisition System, in
conjunction with ECG-100C (electrocardiography) and EDA-100C (electrodermal
activity) modules, were used to collect heart rate and electrodermal activity. Heart rate
was measured using two adhesive, disposable, snap Ag/AgCl electrodes in a Lead II
configuration, one on the carotid artery above the right collarbone and the second located
medial above the left ankle. This Lead II configuration was incorporated to avoid
impeding responses and to decrease movement artifacts associated with the participants
making selections with their right hand. Electrodermal activity was measured using two
electrodes on the participant’s left hand, one on each on the first phalanges of the index
and middle finger (i.e., fingertips). The software package AcqKnowledge 4.1 was used to
record the signals associated with these electrodes and perform computations. Logitech
stereo desktop speakers were used to generate white noise at a controlled decibel level
(85 dB) for the informed consent sample and during the Learning and Testing phases.
2.5 Measures
Published measures exploring a variety of personality and dispositional
characteristics of participants were recreated digitally on an online survey software
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platform (Qualtrics TM) and administered to participants using a laptop computer. The
measures selected explore concepts relevant to DC, including desire for control or
cognition, intolerance of uncertainty, decision-making style, and features of trait anxiety.
In addition, following probability learning trials (described below), a probability
rating sheet and a rank ordering sheet were used to measure a participant’s judgement of
the probability and the ordinal ranking that a particular letter would be followed by an
adverse noise respectively. These sheets were administered after each trial in the
Learning phase and at the conclusion of the Testing phase of the overall procedure.
2.5.1 Desirability of Control.
The Desirability of Control scale (DOC; Burger & Cooper, 1979) was developed
to assess motivation to control of events in one’s life. It is a 20 item measure that uses a
seven-point Likert scale (1 = The statement does not apply to me at all; 7 = The statement
always applies to me). A factor analysis conducted by Burger and Cooper (1979) found
five factors accounting for 50.4% of DOC variance: General Desire for Control (e.g., “I
enjoy having control over my own destiny”); Decisiveness (e.g., “There are many
situations in which I would prefer only one choice rather than having to make a
decision”); Preparation-Prevention Control (e.g., “I like to get a good idea of what a job
is all about before I begin”); Avoidance of Dependence (e.g., “I try to avoid situations
where someone else tells me what to do”); and Leadership (e.g., “I would rather someone
else take over the leadership role when I’m involved in a group project”). The DOC scale
demonstrates good reliability and validity, with adequate construct validity and good testretest reliability (α =.78 and α =.76) according to McCutcheon (2000) and has been used
in previous DC research (Shanahan, 2016).
2.5.2 Need for Cognition.
The Need for Cognition scale (NFC; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao 1984; Cacioppo &
Petty, 1982) was developed to assess the tendency and enjoyment in using information
processing when presented with activities amenable to its use. The 34-item Likert scale
has nine anchors (-4 = very strong disagreement; 4 = very strong agreement). The NFC
has strong internal consistency (α =.90; Cacioppo et al., 1984) and measures a single
factor. Sample questions include “Thinking is not my idea of fun” (reverse scored) and “I
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really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems”. The NFC
has been applied successfully in previous DC research to psychometrically profile
participants (Shanahan, 2016) and abdicate an ability-dependant view of DC in favor of a
personality-dependant view (Benn, 2001, 1995).
2.5.3 Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale.
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, &
Ladouceur, 1994) is a 27-item measure initially constructed to evaluate emotional,
cognitive, and behavioral reactions to uncertainties implicit in situations, oneself, and the
future, as well as the resulting implications of uncertainty on the individual. Items such as
“It frustrates me not having all the information I need” and “I must get away from all
uncertain situations” are rated using a five-point Likert scale (1 = not at all characteristic
of me; 5= entirely characteristic of me). While the scale is scored using a single summary
score, a recent review of factor analytical studies has noted a variety of underlying factors
measured by the IUS (Birrell, Meares, Wilkinson, & Freeston, 2011). In their review,
Birrell and colleagues (2011) identified two consistent factors tapped by the IUS
including the “desire for predictability and an active engagement in seeking certainty”
(IUSF1) and the “paralysis of cognition and action in the face of uncertainty” (IUSF2).
The IUS has been successfully used in recent DC research (Shanahan, 2016), correlating
significantly with measures related to DC and possessing a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.91.
2.5.4 Uncertainty Tolerance Scale.
The Uncertainty Tolerance Scale (UTS; Dalbert, 1996, 1999) measures the
tendency to evaluate uncertain situations as a challenge or as a threat. Responses to the
eight items fall along a 6-point Likert-scale (1 = strongly agree; 6 = strongly disagree.
Sample items include “I like unexpected surprise” and “I like to let things happen”. The
scale has been used successfully in a number of studies by its creator (Dalbert, 1999,
1996a, 1996b; Otto & Dalbert, 2011) and others (Bardi, Guerra, & Ramdeny, 2009; Bude
& Lantermann, 2006).
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2.5.5 General Decision-Making Style.
The General Decision-Making Style (GDMS; Scott & Bruce, 1995) questionnaire
is a 25-item measure with five scales comprised of five questions each. Each scale refers
to conceptually independent, but not mutually exclusive, decision-making styles. They
are: Rational, Intuitive, Dependant, Spontaneous, and Avoidant (GDMS-R, -I, -D, -S, and
-A respectively). Scott and Bruce (1995) found that their results supported individuals
adopting a combination of decision-making styles when making important decisions and
reported internal consistency values (Cronbach’s alpha) for each style ranging from .68 to
.94. Items are endorsed along a five-point Likert scale ( 1 = strongly disagree; 5=
strongly agree) and include the following sample items: “My decision making requires
careful thought” (Rational), “When making decisions, I rely upon my instincts”
(Intuitive), “I rarely make decisions without consulting other people” (Dependent), “I
postpone decision making whenever possible” (Avoidant), and “I generally make snap
decisions” (Spontaneous). One item reported missing by Appelt, Milch, Handgraaf, and
Weber (2011) from the original publication for the Rational scale was absent in our
conducted research as well. The 24-item GDMS has been used effectively in the past to
psychometrically profile participants (Shanahan, 2016).
2.5.6 Endler Multidimensional Anxiety Scale – Trait scale.
The Trait scale of the Endler Multidimensional Anxiety Scale (EMAS-T; Endler,
Parker, Bagby, & Cox, 1991) is used to measure several facets of trait anxiety. It does so
along four situational dimensions: Physical Danger, Social Evaluation, Novel Situations,
and Daily Routine (EMAS-PD, -SE, -NS, and -DR respectively). Each dimension
describes a situation pertinent to what it is measuring and poses 15 identical statements
regarding the responder’s reactions and feelings. These statements are endorsed along an
intensity scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much) and sample statements
include “Seek experiences like this” (reverse scored), “Feel upset”, “Perspire”, and
“Heart beats faster”. Coefficient alpha reliabilities reported by Endler et al. (1991) for a
Canadian undergraduate population on all subscales of the Trait scale are over .92 for
both men and women. The EMAS-T has been used successfully in past DC research to
psychometrically profile individual dispositions linked to its application (Benn 2001;
Shanahan, 2016).
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2.5.7 Probability Rating sheet.
The probability rating sheet was modelled after one used by Lees and Neufeld
(1999) and consisted of a column of ten blank spaces to write a letter and adjacent 100
mm lines. Each 100 mm line was marked with an anchor at 0, 25, 50, 75, and 100
percent. The sheet is used by participants to demark the probability they believe a
particular learned letter will be followed by a stressor.
2.5.8 Rank Ordering sheet.
The rank ordering sheet consisted of 10 blank spaces anchored on the left with the
word “lowest” and on the right with “highest”. A randomized ordering of the 10 letters
participants would learn to associate with a stressor adorned at the top. Participants were
instructed to fill in the 10 blank spaces with the letters in an ordering they believed went
from the lowest to highest probability of being followed by a noise (the stressor).
2.6 Procedure
The experiment consisted of four separate phases hereafter referred to as the
Measures, Learning, Practice, and Testing phases (elaborated upon below). Learning and
testing phases were modelled after the general procedures outlined in Kukde and Neufeld
(1994) and Morrison et al. (1988). Prospective participants read and discussed a brief
description of the experiment with the experimenter and were exposed to a one-second
burst of 85 dB white noise from the computer speakers prior to obtaining informed
consent. All participants agreed to continue and none withdrew.
2.6.1 Measures phase.
During the measures phase, participants completed the digitized measures (i.e. the
DOC, NFC, UTS, EMAS, IUS, and GDMS) using QualtricsTM software on a laptop
computer in the recording area of the laboratory. A research assistant was present to
answer questions and clarify wording for participants. The measures phase took
approximately 30 minutes to complete.
2.6.2 Learning phase.
Following the Measures phase, participants were led to the recording area of the
laboratory, where they sat at a desk with a computer and keyboard. Participants were
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presented with three rounds of learning trials, each followed by a probability judgement
trial. All instructions were presented on the computer screen and participant feedback
during the probability judgement trials was elicited through the use of the probability
rating sheet and ranked order sheet.
Each learning trial consisted of the same 104 presentations of capital, English
alphabetic letters paired with either an "innocuous event" or a "stressor". Each innocuous
event was a one-second computer screen presentation of a green screen (a non-significant
event) and each stressor was a one second burst of 85 dB white noise from the computer
speakers. The stressing properties of the stressor have been ascertained according to
Thurstonian and other scaled subjective and psychophysiological responses in previous
DC research and related studies (Kukde & Neufeld, 1994; Lefave & Neufeld, 1980;
Neufeld & Herzog, 1983; Neufeld & Davidson, 1974). The 104 letter-outcome pairs and
the conditional probabilities of a stressor given a letter are both included in Table 1. For
an example of a conditional probability, the letter D would appear seven times per trial,
two times with a green screen (innocuous event) and five times followed by the white
noise stressor (giving a conditional probability of 5/7=0.71%). Ordering of these letteroutcome pairs was randomized across participants and between trials; all participants
received the same pairs, but in completely random order. The ten letters selected were
identical to those used in Kukde and Neufeld (1994) and Morrison et al. (1988). Their
selection was such that the probability of misidentifying one letter for another was less
than 0.10, as indicated by Townsend's (1971) confusion matrix. The paradigm used in
this study and the above mentioned studies is one pioneered by Estes (1976). Estes’
paradigm allows differential anticipatory stress to occur in response to the chosen letters
due to memory association mechanisms of probability learning (cf. Estes 1976). Unequal
letter frequencies are such that stressor and innocuous events are uncorrelated (r =.02),
but still amenable to Estes’ (1976) model of “categorical memory”. In essence, Estes’
paradigm is designed such that each letter possesses its own inherent probability of a
stressor and is implicitly separate from the probabilities of other letters. Past research has
evidenced that participants’ judgement rankings have a greater tendency to align with the
frequency of stressor occurrences than the conditional probabilities (Morrison et al.,1988;
Mothersill & Neufeld, 1985; Neufeld & Herzog, 1983). As such, the reported subjective
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probabilities from participants in past studies (Lees & Neufeld, 1999; Morrison et al.,
1988) were averaged with the conditional probability to create a hybridized probability.
This hybridized probability is given in Table 1 as the probability of stressor occurrence
during the Experiment phase. It dictates the probability of feedback during the Testing
phase to better align with participant expectations of stressor/innocuous event probability.
Table 1
Letters for Stimulus Presentation (During Learning and Testing phases) and Associated
Frequencies and Probabilities
Letter stimulus

D

B

J

L

M

A

Z

V

P

G

Letter frequency

7

12

9

5

9

6

14

11

18

13

Relative frequency of
stressor

5

4

1

2

2

4

6

7

8

9

Relative frequency of
innocuous event

2

8

8

3

7

2

8

4

10

4

Conditional probability
of stressor given letter
occurrence

0.71 0.33 0.11 0.40 0.22 0.67 0.42 0.64 0.44 0.69

Probability of stressor
occurrence during
Testing phase

0.61 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.33 0.62 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.69

During each learning trial, a letter appeared on the computer screen for two
seconds followed by a two-second delay and then a one-second innocuous or stressor
event. A three-second inter-trial interval would precede the subsequent letter presentation
to allow psychophysiological responding to return to baseline. Participants were
instructed to say aloud any letter paired with a stressor by saying the letter and the word
"noise". For example, if the letter Z was presented and followed by the stressor, a
participant would say "Z noise". If a letter was not followed by a stressor, they were
instructed to say nothing. This methodology was adopted to facilitate the encoding of
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letter-outcome pairs from a modified Estes’ (1976) paradigm found to produce the
greatest salience to noise frequency by Neufeld and Herzog (1983) and to enhance traces
in categorical memory on which probability judgements were found to be determined
(Estes, 1976).
To lessen the cognitive demands of the task on memory and enhance learning,
participants were instructed to arrange ten physical blocks, each with a letter written on it,
in order from least to most likely to be followed by a stressor during inter-trial intervals.
Participants were requested to continue to order the blocks within and across all three
learning trials. Participants were informed that all learning trials contained the same
frequency of letter-outcome pairs with only the ordering randomized.
Participants completed a probability judgement trial following each learning trial.
During a judgement trial, participants were presented with a random letter on screen for
two seconds and given a six-second window to record on the Probability Rating sheet the
letter presented and demark on the line the probability of the letter being followed by the
stressor. Judgements were requested under a short timeframe of six seconds to encourage
participants to report their initial beliefs and not deliberate their answers. Participants
then completed a ranked ordering of the letters from least to most likely to be followed by
a stressor on the Rank Ordering sheet. Once all answers were recorded, participants were
given a two-minute break before the subsequent learning trial began. The Learning phase
took approximately 45 minutes to complete.
2.6.3 Practice phase.
Following the Learning phase, participants were instructed on the rules of a DC
framework and practiced making selections as they would in the Experimental phase.
Participants were given a sheet containing a separate set of ten letters and their
hypothetical probability of being followed by a stressor. They were instructed to make
selections using these letters for the preliminary Practice phase and informed that the ten
letters they had previously learned to associate with stressor occurrences would be
present in the Testing phase. No stressor occurrences were provided during the Practice
phase trials and feedback was displayed for both correct and incorrect selections to
enhance rule learning. Electrodes and leads were connected at the beginning of this phase
to allow time to adhere and calibrate. Participants were encouraged to ask questions to
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the experimenter if any anything was confusing or needed clarification. The Practice
phase took approximately 15 minutes to complete.
2.6.4 Testing phase.
Participants were instructed to respond as they saw fit while obeying the rules of
the paradigm. They were also requested to make responses as quickly and accurately as
possible and reminded that the letters they had learned before would be presented and
followed by either a stressor or an innocuous event. They were informed that although
good performance on the task would result in a reduced probability of experiencing the
stressor, it would not altogether eliminate its occurrence.
All nine architectures (j) were presented twelve times within a block. Participants
completed three blocks in total with a break of unspecified length (participant’s choice)
between each block. Architectures were presented in randomized order with each trial
including a randomized selection of eight of the ten possible letters. An example of each
architecture, as they would be presented to participants, and how participants should
respond can be found in Appendix J.
At the beginning of each trial, participants were instructed to relax for three
seconds. Following the “relax” screen, they were instructed to depress the space bar
which would display the architecture and elements until they were ready to make a
selection. Upon deciding which element to select (from subjective preference and in
accordance with the rules of the game theoretic paradigm) they would release the space
bar and type the letter on the keyboard. Depression of the space bar followed by a
selection is a method used to collect decision-time estimates, a behavioral measure to be
combined with psychophysiological activation for future consideration. Two seconds
after their selection they would receive either an innocuous or stressor outcome for one
second dependant on the probability of stressor occurrence during Testing phase in Table
1 (in an effort to maintain credibility of the experimental treatments). After a half second
delay, they would proceed to the next trials relax screen. Following four presentations of
each architecture per block, however, participants would instead be directed to a stress
measurement scale before going to the next trial. The stress measurement scale would ask
how stressed they were during the past trial from one (no stress) to five (a lot of stress).
Each experimental block took approximately 30 minutes to complete.
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After the last experimental block, participants completed a final Probability
Rating sheet and Rank Ordering sheet. They then received a debriefing sheet and were
assigned course credits for their participation depending on the length of time spent
completing the experiment (.5 credit per half an hour up to 4 credits maximum).
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Chapter 3: Results
The results section is broken up in two main parts with several subheadings. The
results begin by addressing the primary goal of the current research, testing the DC
model. These results are followed by descriptive statistics of the psychometric measures
and their correlations with model testing with the aim of psychometrically profiling DC
amenability.
3.1 DC Model Testing
3.1.1 Indication that learning occurred and participant removal.
Bivariate correlations were completed to investigate the relationship between the
group-averaged subjective probability ratings pre- and post-Testing phase and the
components of Table 1. Significant correlations in order of increasing Pearson’s
correlation coefficients were found between the relative frequency of stressor (r(8) = .89,
p = .001); the conditional probability of stressor given letter occurrence (r(8) = .93, p <
.001); and the probability of stressor occurrence during Testing phase (r(8) = .97, p <
.001). Group-averaged subjective probability ratings were not significantly correlated
with the relative frequency of the innocuous event (r(8) = -.42, p = .23).
Additionally, bivariate correlations were calculated between the group-averaged
subjective probability ratings pre- and post-Testing phase and the subjective probabilities
of two past DC studies using the same Estes’ (1976) learning paradigm. This was done in
an effort to investigate if our participant sample had learned the probabilities and mapped
the ti values in a corresponding way to past research conducted. Pearson’s correlation
coefficients between both participant’s ratings in Morrison et al. (1988) and Lees and
Neufeld (1999) were highly significant, r(8) = .92, p < .001 and r(6) = .96, p < .001
respectively. With these strong correlations, we can say that the findings are consistent
with past research utilizing the same learning paradigm. Also supported is the use of
these past studies subjective probabilities in creating a hybridized probability used in the
Testing phase (see the Methods section for more details).
As an indication of participants sufficiently learning and retaining letter
probabilities during the Learning phase, scores on probability rating sheets pre- and post-
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Testing phase were investigated. Spearman’s rank correlations (rho) were calculated
between participant subjective probability ratings pre- and post-experiment, as the ratings
become monotonically related ranks (ti values). Spearman’s rank correlations were used
as an indicator of consistent learning, and, if participants’ pre- and post-experiment
scores did not correlate highly, it was attributed to a reappraisal of the probabilities
(subjective utilities) within the experiment. As choice selection is assumed to be
dependant on consistent use of MAX EU, a large change in SEU during the Testing phase
undermines the model and our tests of fit. For a participant to be evaluated under this
model, it must be insured that the only departures from the model are due to fit between
objective utilities and subjective utilities and the decision-making strategy chosen. If
participants do not learn the ordering of subjective utilities, we can not attribute the
departure from the model as either specified source. Participants with a rank correlation
above .60, indicative of a strong or very strong correlation (Evans, 1996), were kept for
further analyses. This criterion removed ten participants, bringing the remaining number
of participants to 36. This group of participants will hereafter be referred to as the
Learners Group, as they showed a high level of consistent learning and ordering of
subjective utilities. The group with all participants (except for the 12 eliminated on
grounds mentioned in the Methods section) will be referred to as the All Group (n = 46).
3.1.2 Data cleaning procedures.
Participant data was investigated for any inconsistent rule following during the
Testing phase. Trial data found inconsistent of the rules was removed from analysis or
recoded. If the correct answer could be inferred (through the lack of choice, e.g., in an
NN scenario) or was randomly distributed at the subordinate level (e.g., NU) data was
recoded. In instances where a selection was outside of the available choices (not
displayed as an option) and choice selection could not be inferred (e.g., NC), data was
removed from the total counts for that particular structure (j). Descriptive statistics for the
frequencies are as follows: for the All Group, removed data (N = 46, M = 5.04, SD =
7.57, Mdn = 1.5, Min. = 0, Max. = 26, Range = 26) and recoded data (N = 46, M = 14.28,
SD = 10.37, Mdn = 12.5, Min. = 1, Max. = 38, Range = 37); and for the Learners Group,
removed data (N = 36, M = 5.36, SD = 8.06, Mdn = 1.5, Min. = 0, Max. = 26, Range =
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26) and recoded data (N = 36, M = 13.28, SD = 10.63, Mdn = 8, Min. = 1, Max. = 38,
Range = 37).
3.1.3 Subjective utilities of ti values.
Three models of possible fit were conducted to explore fit with our normative
model; each varying the tendered utilities for each ti value.
The first model, hereafter referred to as the Conditional model, assumed
participants’ subjective utilities were in alignment with the conditional probabilities of
stressor (given letter occurrence) found in Table 1. This model is viewed as the one
containing the objective utilities upon which a normative model would prescribe choices
be made.
The second model, hereafter referred to as the Group model, averaged all
participants’ subjective probability ratings pre- and post-Testing phase and created a
group mean of these means. In essence, the Group model contains the group consensus
on the subjective utilities of each ti value and individual participants’ utilities were
compared to that using the group subjective utilities.
The last model, hereafter referred to as the Individualized model, investigated
model fit using each individuals’ subjective utilities. Using the average of their pre- and
post-Testing phase probability ratings, ti values were constructed for each participant. In
instances where one or more ti values were tied, averaged rank orders from the Rank
Ordering sheet were used to break the tie. In one rare case where both the averaged
probabilities and rank orders were tied, the tie was broken using the participants second
Probability Rating sheet (that occurred before the pre-Testing phase).
Table 2 displays the ti rankings for both the Conditional and Group model.
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Table 2
Conditional and Group Rank Orderings and Probabilities of Letter Presentations
Rank of ti
Conditional model
letter rankings
Conditional model
objective probabilities
of stressor given letter
occurrence
Group model letter
rankings
Group model
subjective probabilities
of stressor given letter
occurrence

1

2
J

M

3

4
B

5
L

6
Z

7
P

8
V

9
A

10
G

D

0.11 0.22 0.33 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.71

J

M

L

B

Z

P

A

D

V

G

0.16 0.23 0.33 0.35 0.51 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.66 0.69

3.1.4 G2 and Pearson χ2 calculations.
As specified in the introduction, DC model and generic saturated model
multinomial likelihoods were calculated for each particular structure (j) using participant
selections and ti rankings (above). Values were calculated for each of the nine structures
using these likelihoods and a summed aggregate (per participant) was created for each
model. This aggregate value represented the overall fit between the participant’s
empirical responses and the model predictions.
3.1.5 Outliers, normality, and transformation.
Outlier data was screened using methodology recommended originally by Tukey
(1977) and updated by Hoaglin and Ignlewicz (1987). This stringent form of outlier
removal multiplies the difference between the 25th and the 75th percentile by a factor of
2.2. This product is then added to the 75th percentile and removed from the 25th
percentile, with extreme values falling outside of this range. Using this methodology, one
G2 value and three Pearson χ2 values were removed. Due to the listwise nature of repeated
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measures ANOVA, the final participant count used in the ANOVA analysis below was
32.
The assumption of normality was tested through examination of the
unstandardized residuals for all G2 and Pearson χ2 values. Review of the KolmogorovSmirnov (Lilliefors correction) and the Shapiro-Wilk tests of skewness and normality
suggested both were violated and histograms suggested data was positively skewed in all
cases. For G2, D(32) = .19, p = .005 and W(32) = .86, p = .001, D(32) = .20, p = .002 and
W(32) = .84, p < .001, and D(32) =.20, p = .002 and W(32) = .89, p = .003 for the
Conditional, Group, and Individualized models respectively. For Pearson χ2, D(32) = .25,
p < .001 and W(32) = .76, p < .001, D(32) = .24, p < .001 and W(32) = .77, p < .001, and
D(32) = .22, p < .001 and W(32) = .77, p < .001 for the Conditional, Group, and
Individualized models respectively.
Due to violations in normality, a log10 transformation was performed on the data
(Field, 2013). Following the transformation, no significant violations of normality were
observed and no outliers were recommended for removal. As results from analyses
performed below were in alignment with results occurring with the log10 transformed
data, results on untransformed data alone are presented in both the ANOVA and
correlations.
3.1.6 Repeated measures one-way ANOVA.
A one-way within subjects (repeated measures) ANOVA was conducted to
compare the effect of model (Conditional, Group, and Individualized) on G2 and Pearson
χ2 fit indices. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated
for the main effects of model on both G2 and Pearson χ2 values, χ2(2) = 18.43, p < .001
and χ2(2) = 52.23, p < .001 respectively, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected
using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ɛ = .69 and ɛ = .55 respectively). The
results show that the G2 and Pearson χ2 values were both significantly affected by which ti
configuration that was used, F(1.37, 42.50) = 12.02, p < .001, ɳp2 = .28 and F(1.10,
33.98) = 8.77, p = .005, ɳp2 = .22 respectively.
A priori post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction were conducted and were
appropriately warranted given the statistically significant omnibus ANOVA F-test. All
significance testing reported below used two-tails in order to be conservative. For G2
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values, no significant difference was found between the Conditional (M = 192.14, SD =
117.25) and Group model (M = 172.00, SD = 106.25), however, there was a significant
difference between the Individualized model (M = 116.59, SD = 60.19) and both the
Conditional model (p = .002, Cohen’s dz = .70) and the Group model (p = .006, Cohen’s
dz = .60). For Pearson χ2 values, the same pattern appeared with no significant difference
between the Conditional (M = 705.55, SD = 783.48) and Group model (M = 733.10, SD =
832.51), but a significant difference between the Individualized model (M = 288.20, SD =
294.79) and both the Conditional model (p = .018, Cohen’s dz = .52) and the Group
model (p = .014, Cohen’s dz = .54). Estimated marginal means patterns are depicted in
Figure 3 and Figure 4.
3.1.7 Canonical correlations.
In addition to the repeated measures analysis, a canonical correlation analysis was
conducted in order to determine the relationship between the three G2 values and the
three Pearson χ2 values. The first of the two variable sets consisted of the three G2 values
and the second set consisted of the three Pearson χ2 values. Two separate canonical
correlations were conducted, one with all participants (the All Group) and the other with
the Learners Group. The results presented below are for the Learners Group; All Group
results can be found in Appendix B. Bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients between
the fit indices can be found below in the Correlations section of Psychometric Data.
Results from the Learners Group indicated three significant canonical functions
emerged, Rc = .974, Wilk’s Λ = .006, F(9, 73.16) = 56.32, p < .001, for function 1; Rc =
.885, Wilk’s Λ = .127, F(4, 62.00) = 27.952, p < .001, for function 2; and Rc = .643,
Wilk’s Λ = .587, F(1, 32.00) = 22.56, p < .001, for function 3. As Wilk’s Λ represents the
variance unexplained by the model and 1- Λ gives us the full model effect size in r2, the
full model explained about 99.4% of the variance shared between the two variable sets.
Given that the Rc2 effects for the first two functions accounted for 95% and 78% of shared
variance respectively, only the first two functions were considered relevant in the context
of the study.

35

225

**
**

Marginal Mean

200

175

150
192.14
172.00

125
116.59

100
Conditional

Group
Model

Individualized

Figure 3. Marginal Means of G2 Values for the Three Models. Error bars represent
standard error of the marginal means. * indicates p <.05; ** indicates p <.01.
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Figure 4. Marginal Means of 2 Values for the Three Models. Error bars represent
standard error of the marginal means. * indicates p <.05; ** indicates p <.01.
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In the first function, all of the G2 values of the first set (Individualized Model [.649], Group Model [.557], and Conditional Model [.509]) and all of the Pearson χ2
values of the second set (Individualized Model [-.716], Group Model [.686], and
Conditional Model [.656]) loaded onto the function with moderate canonical loadings.
The redundancy indices for the first and second set were .341 and .447 respectively. Of
particular interest is the directionality of the two Individualized Model fit values which
are negatively related to this canonical variate relative to the other two models. As
participants’ subjective utilities of rank ti values dominate their ti selections, their fit
values on the Group and Conditional models become worse and vice versa. It appears
that the first factor is parsing out two sets of individuals, those who rely on subjective
utilities and those who rely on environmentally defined utilities. Elaborately separating
those whose cognitive mapping was rooted in uniquely subjective utilities, which
surmounted normative and group choice selection, and those who correctly inferred the
environment defined utilities and whose subjective utilities evidently corresponded to
normative utilities.
In the second function, all of the G2 values of the first set (Individualized Model [.758], Group Model [-.829], and Conditional Model [-.477]) and all of the Pearson χ2
values of the second set (Individualized Model [-.698], Group Model [-.727], and
Conditional Model [-.685]) loaded onto the function with moderate to high canonical
loadings. The redundancy indices for the first and second set were .389 and .387
respectively. From these results, there appears to be a factor which accounts for
unidirectional variance in each model which is not accounted for by the first factor.
3.2 Psychometric Data
A MANOVA was run to investigate any gender differences in psychometric
responding and with fit indexes prior to reporting descriptive statistics. No significant
results were found and descriptive statistics reported below will be collapsed across
gender.
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3.2.1 Desirability of Control.
The DOC with college students has a theoretical mean around 100 and a standard
deviation around 10. Participant scores on the DOC were normally distributed (n = 36, M
= 99.14, SD = 8.19, and range = 83 to 115).
3.2.2 Need for Cognition.
The need for cognition has a theoretical range from -136 to 136. Participant scores
on the NFC were normally distributed (n = 36, M = -5.11, SD = 15.43, and range = -42 to
28). A positive score represents an enjoyment in using cognition and a negative score
represents an aversion to it.
3.2.3 Intolerance of Uncertainty.
The need for cognition has a theoretical range from 27 to 135. Participant total
scores on the IUS were normally distributed (n = 36, M = 65.89, SD = 13.51, and range =
38 to 98), as were the aggregated scores on the two factors identified by Birrell et al.
(2011) as “desire for predictability and an active engagement in seeking certainty” (n =
36, M = 34.67, SD = 8.28, and range = 17 to 51) and “paralysis of cognition and action in
the face of uncertainty” (n = 36, M = 21.19, SD = 4.79, and range = 12 to 29). Hereafter,
the two factors will be referred to as IUSFactor1 and IUSFactor2 respectively.
3.2.4 Uncertainty Tolerance Scale.
The UTS has a theoretical range from 8 to 48. Participant total scores on the UTS
were normally distributed (n = 36, M = 26.97, SD = 5.16, and range = 13 to 39). Higher
values are indicative of a greater tolerance to uncertainty.
3.2.5 General Decision-Making Style.
The GDMS yields five scores, one for each of the decision-making styles it
investigates. The Rational, Dependent, Spontaneous, and Avoidant decision styles were
normally distributed, but the Intuitive style was not, W(32) = .93, p = .031. Each
aggregate score is made up of five questions, except for Rational (for reasons mentioned
in the methods section).
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3.2.6 Endler Multidimensional Anxiety Scale – Trait scale.
The Trait scale of the EMAS yields a measure of trait-based anxiety along four
situational dimensions: Physical Danger (PD), Social Evaluation (SE), Novel Situations
(NS), and Daily Routines (DR). Each dimension ranges from 15 to 75 and every
dimension was normally distributed except for Daily Routines, W(32) = .89, p = .002.

3.2.7 Fit indices.
Descriptive statistics for the fit indices can be found in Table 3. Tests of normality can be
found in 3.1.5. Outliers, normality, and transformation.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for the Fit Indices by Model

Model
n
Conditional
32
Group
32
Individualized 32

G2
M (SD)
192.14 (117.25)
172.00 (106.25)
116.59 (60.19)

range
393.62
375.49
256.01

n
32
32
32

Pearson χ2
M (SD)
705.55 (783.48)
733.10 (832.51)
288.20 (294.79)

range
2878.81
2994.37
1102.35

3.2.8 Correlations.
Table 4 contains the bivariate correlations for all psychometric measures and the
G2 and Pearson χ2 values for the Learners Group. As the majority of measures were
normally distributed, Pearson’s correlation coefficient is reported for all. A Spearman’s
rho correlation, not reported, found a consistent trend in the results and supported our use
of Pearson’s correlation coefficient. All reported Pearson correlation coefficient
significance tests are two-tailed.
DOC significantly correlated with GDMS-S (r[34] = -.428, p = .009), which
represents that those who endorsed enjoying and desiring the use of cognition would be
less likely to endorse a spontaneous approach to decision-making.
EMAS-PD significantly correlated with NFC (r[34] = -.458, p = .005), indicating
that those who would prefer more cognitive control and have a greater tendency (and
want) for thinking about problems possess lower levels of trait anxiety towards situations
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of PD. EMAS-PD also significantly correlated with GDMS-D (r[34] = .419, p = .011),
GDMS-I (r[34] = -.429, p = .009) and GDMS-R (r[34] = .353, p = .035). These results
indicate a positive relationship between having trait anxiety towards situations of PD and
preferring others to assist in the decision-making process or make decisions for the
individual, not wanting to rely on one’s instincts to make decisions, and preferring to
rationally contemplate a choice of action.
The IUS was also significantly correlated with the UTS (r[34] = -.410, p = .013),
indicating that those endorsing a greater intolerance to uncertainty would be less likely to
endorse being tolerant of uncertainty. In particular, the first factor of IUS was quite
significantly correlated with the UTS (r[34] = -.396, p = .017), which means that those
endorsing a lower tolerance (aversion) to uncertainty would desire more predictability
and engage in activities which seek certainty.
The NFC was significantly correlated with the GDMS-D (r[34] = -.446, p = .006),
indicating that those who would prefer more cognitive control and have a greater
tendency (and want) for thinking about problems would be less likely to adopt a
dependant decision making style.
A number of the decision-making styles in the GDMS have significant
correlations with one another, indicative of individuals using a combination of decisionmaking styles. Significant correlations include: GDMS-D with GDMS-A (r[34] = ..660,
p < .001), GDMS-S (r[34] = .442, p = .007), and GDMS-R (r[34] = .578, p < .001);
GDMS-A with GDMS-S (r[34] = .371, p = .026), and GDMS-R (r[34] = .480, p = .003);
and GDMS-S with GDMS-R (r[34] = .476, p = .003).
In a similar fashion to the canonical correlations, correlations between fit indexes
found a highly positive correlation between Individualized G2 and Pearson χ2 values
(r[34] = .922, p = < .001), between Group G2 and Pearson χ2 values (r[34] = .906, p = <
.001), between Conditional G2 and Pearson χ2 values (r[34] = .469 p = .004), and
between Group and Conditional G2 (r[34] = .718, p < .001) and Pearson χ2 values (r[34]
= .940, p = < .001) respectively. No significant correlations between the Individualized
model and the Group or Conditional models for either fit index were found.
The only significant correlations found with fit indexes and psychometric
measures were between the EMAS-NS and both the Individualized model G2 (r[34] =
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.358, p = .032) and Pearson χ2 (r[34] = .377, p = .023) values. This indicates that those
who experience a higher degree of trait anxiety towards novel situations would be more
inclined to deviate from the Conditional model’s objective and the Group model’s
consensual utilities in favor of (personal) subjective utilities.
A number of significant correlations within the All Group overlap and have the
same intuitive meaning with those in the Learners Group. Future sufficiency testing will
consider disparate and similar responding between both groups to elucidate group
differences. A correlation matrix for the All Group can be found in Appendix C for
further consideration.
3.2.9 Canonical correlations.
A canonical correlation analysis was conducted in order to determine the
relationship between the psychometric measures and the G2 and Pearson χ2 values across
models. Two canonical correlations were conducted, one with the All Group and one
with the Learners Group. No significant canonical correlations were found for either
analysis. Following methodology outlined for Canonical Correlation (Neufeld, 1977),
proportions of redundant variance were explored. By aggregating the redundancy indexes
of the second set (fit indexes) by the first set (psychometric measures), the total variance
accounted for by the first set can be enumerated. In the Learners group, the collect
amount of variance was .403, making the average amount of variance accounted for by
each (n=6) of the non-significant canonical correlations 6.7% of the variance.
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Table 4
Correlation Matrix for Psychometric Measures and Fit Indices
DOC
DOC
EMAS-PD
EMAS-SE
EMAS-NS
EMAS-DR
IUSTot
IUSF1
IUSF2
NFC
UTS
GDMS-D
GDMS-A
GDMS-S
GDMS-I
GDMS-R
GInd
PInd
GGroup
PGroup
GCon
PCon

.00
-.12
.17
-.27
-.01
.06
-.06
.23
-.10
-.25
-.33
-.43
.15
-.07
.10
-.03
.22
.23
.08
.25

EMAS-PD EMAS-SE EMAS-NS EMAS-DR

-.02
.25
.31
.16
.01
.17
-.46
-.17
.42
.16
.32
-.43
.35
.00
.18
.02
.16
.01
.21

.07
-.05
-.01
.03
-.08
-.10
-.09
.15
.06
-.12
-.05
-.11
-.17
-.12
.04
.12
-.06
.17

-.02
-.13
-.06
-.20
.16
-2.8
.10
-.07
.21
.05
.08
.36
.38
.30
.29
.15
.24

.29
.18
.21
-.24
.03
.20
-.07
.04
-.23
.08
-.11
-.10
.15
.22
.27
.20

IUSTot

IUSF1

IUSF2

NFC

UTS

GDMS-D

.90
.71
-.21
-.41
.16
-.05
.20
-.02
-.04
-.33
-.28
-.09
.13
.02
.06

.37
-.05
-.40
.06
-.05
.19
.09
-.04
-.26
-.24
-.10
.07
-.07
.02

-.30
-.26
.16
.00
.04
-.16
-.04
-.25
-.22
.01
.12
.14
.06

.13
-.45
-.23
-.24
.30
-.13
.04
-.09
.08
.07
-.08
.05

-.26
-.14
-.18
-.06
-.15
.05
-.04
-.05
-.18
.01
-.14

.66
.44
-.19
.58
.13
.26
.09
.08
-.01
.11

Underline indicates p < .05 (2-tailed); Boldface indicates p < .001(2-tailed).
DOC: Desirability of Control; EMAS: Endler Multidimensional Anxiety Scale – Trait Scale, -PD: Physical Danger, -SE: Social
Evaluation, -NS: Novel Situations, -DR: Daily Routines; IUSTot: Intolerance of Uncertainty total score, -F1: factor 1, -F2: factor 2;
NFC: Need for Cognition; UTS: Uncertainty Tolerance Scale; GDMS: General Decision-Making Scale, -D: Dependent, -A:
Avoidant, -S: Spontaneous, -I: Intuitive, -R: Rational; GInd: G2 for the Individualized model; PInd: Pearson χ2 for Individualized
model; GGroup: G2 for the Group model; PGroup: Pearson χ2 for Group model; GCon: G2 for the Conditional model; PCon: Pearson
χ2 for Conditional model.
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Table 5
Correlation Matrix for Psychometric Measures and Fit Indices (Continued)
DOC
EMAS-PD
EMAS-SE
EMAS-NS
EMAS-DR
IUSTot
IUSF1
IUSF2
NFC
UTS
GDMS-D
GDMS-A
GDMS-S
GDMS-I
GDMS-R
GInd
PInd
GGroup
PGroup
GCon
PCon

GDMS-A

GDMS-S

GDMS-I

GDMS-R

GInd

PInd

GGroup

PGroup

GCon

.37
-.21
.48
.16
.24
.08
-.02
-.05
-.03

-.12
.48
.04
.22
-.26
-.22
-.17
-.25

-.20
.11
-.02
-.07
-.12
-.03
-.22

.07
.13
-.19
-.24
-.40
-.10

.92
.26
.05
-.01
.06

.12
.02
-.07
.02

.91
.72
.85

.66
.94

.47

Underline indicates p < .05 (2-tailed); Boldface indicates p < .001(2-tailed).
DOC: Desirability of Control; EMAS: Endler Multidimensional Anxiety Scale – Trait Scale, -PD: Physical Danger, -SE: Social
Evaluation, -NS: Novel Situations, -DR: Daily Routines; IUSTot: Intolerance of Uncertainty total score, -F1: factor 1, -F2: factor 2;
NFC: Need for Cognition; UTS: Uncertainty Tolerance Scale; GDMS: General Decision-Making Scale, -D: Dependent, -A:
Avoidant, -S: Spontaneous, -I: Intuitive, -R: Rational; GInd: G2 for the Individualized model; PInd: Pearson χ2 for Individualized
model; GGroup: G2 for the Group model; PGroup: Pearson χ2 for Group model; GCon: G2 for the Conditional model; PCon: Pearson
χ2 for Conditional model.
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Chapter 4: Discussion
4.1 Discussion for the Primary Purpose of the Study
Using a game-theoretic probability mixture-model created for our normative
model of DC, sources of differential conformity between our collected participant data
and the theoretical predictions posited by our formal normative model were explored.
Specifically, the conformity or departure from the objective utilities imposed by the
environmental framework were explored using three models of potential subjective
utilities. The first model denoted the Conditional model, posited that participants would
be perfect learners of the conditional probabilities of stressor occurrence from the Estes’
(1976) paradigm and their subjective utilities would perfectly match the objective
utilities.
Previous DC research has shown this not to be the case and have found that group
averages of subjective utilities differ from the objective utilities one would except having
learned the conditional probabilities (Lees & Neufeld, 1999; Morrison et al., 1988). As
such, the second model, the Group model, had ti values that were created through
averaging pre- and post-Testing phase subjective probabilities. This was viewed as a
logical way of accounting for departures in learning from the Estes’ paradigm (1976) and
learning was consistent with findings from previous DC studies using the same learning
paradigm (Lees & Neufeld, 1999; Morrison et al., 1988). Another reason for using a
Group model is that it allows the generalization of findings. It helps educe those item
properties that did enter into subjects’ formations of ti (properties that were encoded at
least in part), with an aim of generating consensus.
The final Individualized model used the participant’s individually-specific,
subjective utilities to investigate any departure from the normative model. Since the
participant’s own subjective utilities were used, the normative model would expect a
perfect fit if it was being followed rigorously by participants. Incongruence under this
model may be accounted for by varied decision-making styles or not perceiving
accurately the experimental contingencies. The normative DC model assumes a
maximizing/maximax strategy is adopted by participants, which may be true of some
individuals and not of others.
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Three different models of potential fit were investigated using G2 and Pearson χ2
fit indices. While there are many potential ways of assessing fit, both were selected as
each allows statistical inference at the individual level. This is an important characteristic
that will be required for future sufficiency testing and one which is advantageously used
for the secondary aim of this current research. The use of G2 is common place in model
testing as maximum likelihood procedures are often favored over procedures using sum
of squares (cf. Ashby, 1992; Wickens, 1982).
Results indicated that the Individualized model fit the participants responding
significantly better than the Group and Conditional models. The departure of the
Individualized model does leave us to believe that incorporating individual subjective
utilities into our DC normative model is necessary to achieve the best fit. Results from
both canonical correlations (between G2 and Pearson χ2 variable sets) are in agreement
with this statement. The first function when analyzing all participants (All Group; in
Appendix B), found that subjectivity of the individual ti values accounted for 92% of the
variance shared between the two variable sets. The variance accounted for combined with
the loading, imply that subjective utilities were the driving force of fit. As this canonical
correlation included all participants (All Group), including those not included in the
repeated measures ANOVA due to poor learning, it can be contrasted with the Learners
Group. Comparing both canonical correlation’s first factor, we see that the All Group’s
canonical loadings were specific to the Individualized model of ti configurations alone,
while in the Learners Group all three models had high canonical loadings. The interesting
finding from the Learners Group, as mentioned in the methods section, was due to the
directionality of the loadings. In the Learners Group, it appears that individuals who were
kept for analysis either had ti values that conformed somewhat to the objective and group
ti values or who consistently adhered to their subjective utilities (in the face of the
environmental contingencies of stressor probability and likely many negative outcomes).
These canonical loadings support the normative DC models use by individuals whose
subjective utilities were in line with objective utilities. These individuals had learned to
appropriately create optimal subjective utilities given Estes’ learning paradigm (1976),
were reinforced by the environmental framework of the normative model, and were able
to assess and select MAX EU. Another subpopulation utilizing the normative DC model,
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but likely not performing as well (experiencing more stressor outcomes), were
individuals who had departures in creating optimal subjective utilities given Estes’
learning paradigm (1976), were or were not reinforced by the environmental framework
of the normative model, but were able to select consistently the subjective utility they
believed had MAX EU. Further research could investigate what dispositional and
personality factors individuals in either group possessed, combined with outcomes of the
environment, may have led these individuals to either learn to appropriately create SEUs
or adhere to their SEUs while responding as the normative DC model theorized.
Considering our three groups, it is worth noting that we used the conditional
(objective) probabilities as our normative representative throughout testing. Given that
participants could been develop and operate off of a range of unforeseen utilities, the use
of the normative probabilities was a limitation of the study that could bias participants in
favor of its use. Especially as the conditional probabilities were fortified according to the
credibility-maintaining delivery of stressor or innocuous event during the experimental
trials. If anything entered into the participants cognitive mapping, it presumably would be
the influence of the Conditional model objective probabilities. For example, considering
the role of Bayes’, one would assume that participants would pick up on the normative
prescribed environmental cueing and being to conform to the objective probabilities (if
they were not using these utilities already). Despite this, the findings supported the
subjective utilities as the prevailing structure predicting selections.
Understanding what factors lead to the departure from the Conditional model to
the Individualized one is relevant to improving person-environment interchange.
Individuals may subjectively appraise one act as worse than another, but that does not
make it so. In situations where being able to discern and utilize objective utilities is
gravely important (e.g., in a combat scenario, flying a plane, hitting an ice patch while
driving), a way is needed to help these individuals make better decisions. To have them
learn and use objective utilities over subjective utilities. Departures from normative
models are the result of DMs not being perfect rational beings. Comparing these three
models allows us to empirically quantify the departure. These results necessarily inform
the inclusion of subjective utilities in the present research and highlight that the groupaveraged (consensus) subjective utilities conform more with the objective utilities. Future
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sufficiency research will investigate the critical values for each individual, under each
model, necessary to identify a non-trivial departure. Further follow up work comparing
individual critical values of fit and psychometric data, may better identify the
characteristics of an individual with a high or low DC amenability.
The significant difference between the Individualized model and the other two
models highlights the importance of considering SEUs when studying coping. In recent
DC studies (Benn, 2001; Shanahan, 2016), participants were provided and learned the
objective utilities that corresponded to the ti values prior to model testing. Rigorously
parsing out the subjectivity in stress and coping research may reduce the real-world
applicability of the model. By incorporating the Estes’ paradigm (1976), participants
were able to form their own subjective utilities, which also allowed the three rules of a
normative model to influence their decision. This was a strength of the current research.
For example, the participants who were removed to form the Learners group may have
had their subjective utilities change during the Testing phase due to inference under
uncertainty (Edwards & Fasolo, 2001). It is possible that poor performance during the
Testing phase coupled with potential personal factors (e.g., trait anxiety to novel
situations, intolerance of uncertainty, etc.) brought about dynamic updating (re-appraisal)
of SEUs. It does not mean that the DC normative model was not at work, it might be that
the subjective utilities had not be concretely mapped for these participants and more
readily changed.
Purposefully, the Testing phase was broken into three blocks of identical, but
randomly ordered trials. In future research, outcomes (benign or with a stressor) and their
relation to dynamical updating and personality variables will be investigated. It may be
possible to illustrate when a cognitive re-appraisal occurs during the blocks and accounts
for differences seen in pre- and post-Testing phase subjective probabilities. As well,
identifying these areas of interest could lend further support our normative model of DC,
by allowing responses to be recoded due to subjective re-appraisal of MAX EU values
between and during Testing phase blocks. The inclusion a measures which tap
participant’s confidence in their rated subjective probabilities and queries self-reported
re-appraisal of SEUs during the session would be recommended inclusions for future
research.
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Currently, a limitation of using an averaged (consensus) score consisting of preand post- subjective probabilities is that rank orderings may have differed throughout the
Testing phase blocks. An average value also limits our understanding of the magnitude of
the re-appraisal which occurred. For example, a participant may rightly believe that letter
J possesses the MAX EU and is followed by a stressor roughly 10% of the time after
completing the Learning phase. After the first block of the Testing phase, which may
have contained many instances of selecting J and receiving the stressor, the participant
may update their subjective utility to believe J is followed by a stressor 60% of the time.
Continuing to work on this belief through the next two blocks, they report that J is
followed by a stressor 60% of the time on the post-Testing phase probability rating sheet.
An average of these two probabilities leads to a score of 35%, which may situate J as
their t3 value. Responding across the first block where J was their t1 value and across the
next two blocks where J was possibly their t5 value may conform to our DC normative
model predictions, but not be captured properly by the averaging. In essence, the
averaging of these rating sheets, while the best choice at attempting to understand their
subjective utilities and common, may increase departure from the DC normative model.
For this reason, only participants with strong internal consistency (as evaluated by
Spearman’s rank correlations), and presumably a small magnitude of change pre- and
post-Testing phase, were included in the repeated measures ANOVA. While this is likely
to minimize its effect on our results, it cannot be disregarded altogether. Results should
be considered with this limitation in mind until future sufficiency testing on this data can
assist in evaluating how well individuals conform to the DC normative model.
In the Individualized model, individuals varied in the size of their fit estimate. As
alluded to in previous sections, this departure can be due to sub-optimal decision-making
styles. The DC model assumes that DMs will utilize a maximizing/maximax strategy and
make a choice at a node that potentially leads to the minimally available ti. From the
range of fit scores, this may not be true of all individuals. Further analyses would
deconstruct the aggregate fit indices into their nine different architectures (j) and explore
in what situations, where DC is available, do participants select the minimally available
ti. These results will be further augmented with analyses investigating response time and
psychophysiological indices of stress generation. Based on prior DC research (Shanahan
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et al., 2012; Shanahan & Neufeld, 2010), U at a subordinate node leads to higher stress
generation and more contemplation. It is possible to disentangle those individuals who
exhaustively search for and select the MAX EU as one would expect from a maximizer
using the gathered empirical sources of corroborating data in this research. By
investigating these individuals’ data, we can hope to discern what about this group of
DMs makes them more likely to adopt a maximizing decision-making style.
With regards to testing the model using participant responses, the DC normative
model’s theoretically prescribed probabilities for responding can be adjusted to fit the
data. Currently the normative model assumes a very rigid degree of conformity that does
not allow for decision-making styles other than maximizing/maximax. Using the
Individualized model, whereby strategy per se is thrown into relief, these theoretical
predictions can be relaxed and aligned with typical responding (accounting for other
decision-making styles). By doing so, the model can more accurately capture normative
stress-coping and attempts at replication with a new sample are possibilities.
4.2 Discussion for the Secondary Purpose of the Study.
In order to investigate sources of departure from the normative DC model,
correlations were run between measures used in previous DC research and presumed to
have role in decision-making, disposition towards uncertainty and fit indices. While a
number of significant correlations were found between psychometric measures, decidedly
fewer significant correlations were found between psychometric measures and fit indices.
A canonical correlation was run between the fit indices and the psychometric
measures in an effort to identify measures which account for a large proportion of
variance seen between fit indices. Results were non-significant and redundancy indexes
did not account for much variance. There were a couple notable significant correlations
between trait anxiety to novel situations and both fit values for the Individualized model,
as well as interesting trends between fit indices. However, based on the relatively small
value from aggregating the redundancy indexes and due to the paucity of bivariate
correlations found, speculations and judgements will be withheld until future studies can
address personality variables in a confirmatory way. For example, future research could
include running this canonical correlation again between individuals who are identified
by sufficiency testing as applicable users of the normative DC model and those who did
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not sufficiently use the model. Lastly, it is noteworthy that the bivariate collection array
is exploratory, as there is no provision for multiple tests on the individual conditions (cf.
Larzelere & Mulaik, 1977).
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
In pursuit of necessity testing the normative DC model, the Individualized model
was found to be significantly better than both the Conditional and Group models. As
such, for the normative DC model to operate in conditions amenable to its use, subjective
ti values unique to each individual must be collected and used in creating fit indices.
Individual differences in fit were not tapped by the selected psychometric measures and
possibly lay outside of the personality domain. Future sufficiency testing used to identify
conditions, decision-making styles (maximizers or satisficers) and psychometric
correlates which are sufficient for the function of the normative DC model will require
the use of subjective utilities.
As the first DC study to use frequency data in order to construct multinomial
likelihood ratios with the aim of evaluating goodness-of-fit (and also contrasting these
results with Pearson’s χ2 values of fit), this study has identified the necessary components
of model fit to be considered for future research. With our novel mixture model
architecture, we are also well situated for subsequent sufficiency testing.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Formulae for the Probabilities of Engaging Decisional Control
structure element i, Pr(ti)

1.0

if

if i ≤ p (q – 1) + 1
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Appendix B: All Group Canonical Correlations
Results for the All Group indicated that three significant canonical functions
emerged, Rc = .964, Wilk’s Λ = .007, F(9, 97.5) = 71.50, p < .001, for function 1; Rc =
.927, Wilk’s Λ = .101, F(4, 82.00) = 44.14, p < .001, for function 2; and Rc = .532,
Wilk’s Λ = .717, F(1, 42.00) = 16.58, p < .001, for function 3. As Wilk’s Λ represents the
variance unexplained by the model and 1- Λ gives us the full model effect size in r2, the
full model explained about 99.3% of the variance shared between the two variable sets.
Given that the Rc2 effects for the first two functions accounted for 92% and 86% of shared
variance respectively, only the first two functions were considered relevant in the context
of the study.
The only variable in the first set that loaded onto the first function was the G2
value for the Individualized Model (.889) and the only variable from the second set that
loaded was the Pearson χ2 value for the Individualized Model (.887). The redundancy
indices for the first and second set were .249 and .251 respectively. From these results, it
appears the first function demonstrates a link between both measures of Individualized
model fit and accounts for variance unique to the use of subjective ti values. Thus, it can
be inferred that ti values are related the first canonical correlation.
In the second function, both the G2 value for the Group Model (.996) and the G2
value for the Conditional Model (.670) from the first set loaded, as did both the Pearson
χ2 value for the Group Model (.983) and the Pearson χ2 value for the Conditional Model
(.963) in the second set. The redundancy indices for the first and second set were .471
and .597 respectively. From these results, it appears the second function demonstrates a
link between both measures of Group and Conditional Model fit and accounts for
variance shared between the Group and Conditional orderings of ti values. It is worth
pointing out that this variance is orthogonal to the variance accounted for by both
measures of Individualized Model fit.
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Appendix C: All Group Correlation Matrix for Psychometric Measures and Fit Indices
DOC
DOC
EMAS-PD
EMAS-SE
EMAS-NS
EMAS-DR
IUSTot
IUSF1
IUSF2
NFC
UTS
GDMS-D
GDMS-A
GDMS-S
GDMS-I
GDMS-R
GInd
PInd
GGroup
PGroup
GCon
PCon

.07
.02
.12
-.25
-.01
.06
-.09
.14
-.08
-.25
-.14
-.32
.20
.05
.13
-.01
.25
.24
.11
.22

EMAS-PD EMAS-SE EMAS-NS EMAS-DR

.10
.30
.30
.29
.15
.28
-.44
-.09
.32
.12
.21
-.14
.28
.10
.22
.15
.19
.08
.27

.08
-.05
.05
.08
-.03
-.23
-.11
.10
.00
-.02
-.04
-.01
-.11
-.08
.12
.15
.01
.20

.16
.21
.15
.21
-.18
-.24
-.06
-.10
.14
.05
.11
.08
.16
.27
.25
.16
.30

.42
.28
.39
-.32
.00
.12
-.10
.06
-.14
.12
-.09
-.02
.15
.21
.27
.25

IUSTot

IUSF1

IUSF2

NFC

UTS

GDMS-D

.90
.84
-.39
-.35
.01
-.08
.18
.10
.02
-.06
.05
.09
.18
.10
.25

.54
-.21
-.40
-.01
-.05
.17
.12
.01
.00
.08
.07
.16
.02
.20

-.44
-.18
-.02
-.07
.08
.06
-.01
-.12
-.01
.09
.12
.14
.21

.21
-.20
.05
-.13
.14
-.13
-.07
-.19
-.11
-.07
-.14
-.19

-.17
-.01
-.12
.03
-.14
-.12
-.19
-.15
-.24
-.03
-.23

.61
.42
-.21
.50
-.03
.03
-.04
-.02
-.05
-.04

Underline indicates p < .05 (2-tailed); Boldface indicates p < .001(2-tailed).
DOC: Desirability of Control; EMAS: Endler Multidimensional Anxiety Scale – Trait Scale, -PD: Physical Danger, -SE: Social
Evaluation, -NS: Novel Situations, -DR: Daily Routines; IUSTot: Intolerance of Uncertainty total score, -F1: factor 1, -F2: factor 2;
NFC: Need for Cognition; UTS: Uncertainty Tolerance Scale; GDMS: General Decision-Making Scale, -D: Dependent, -A:
Avoidant, -S: Spontaneous, -I: Intuitive, -R: Rational; GInd: G2 for the Individualized model; PInd: Pearson χ2 for Individualized
model; GGroup: G2 for the Group model; PGroup: Pearson χ2 for Group model; GCon: G2 for the Conditional model; PCon: Pearson
χ2 for Conditional model.
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Appendix D: All Group Correlation Matrix for Psychometric Measures and Fit Indices (continued)
GDMS-A GDMS-S GDMS-I GDMS-R
GInd
PInd
GGroup
PGroup
GCon
DOC
EMAS-PD
EMAS-SE
EMAS-NS
EMAS-DR
IUSTot
IUSF1
IUSF2
NFC
UTS
GDMS-D
GDMS-A
.42
GDMS-S
-.19
-.19
GDMS-I
.47
.49
-.19
GDMS-R
-.12
-.27
.24
-.06
GInd
-.16
-.20
.16
-.06
.95
PInd
-.13
-.33
.07
-.17
.48
.44
GGroup
-.19
-.30
-.01
-.23
.29
.30
.91
PGroup
-.12
-.20
.03
-.36
.13
.12
.72
.68
GCon
-.25
-.30
-.06
-.10
.33
.37
.88
.93
.51
PCon
Underline indicates p < .05 (2-tailed); Boldface indicates p < .001(2-tailed).
DOC: Desirability of Control; EMAS: Endler Multidimensional Anxiety Scale – Trait Scale, -PD: Physical Danger, -SE: Social
Evaluation, -NS: Novel Situations, -DR: Daily Routines; IUSTot: Intolerance of Uncertainty total score, -F1: factor 1, -F2: factor 2;
NFC: Need for Cognition; UTS: Uncertainty Tolerance Scale; GDMS: General Decision-Making Scale, -D: Dependent, -A:
Avoidant, -S: Spontaneous, -I: Intuitive, -R: Rational; GInd: G2 for the Individualized model; PInd: Pearson χ2 for Individualized
model; GGroup: G2 for the Group model; PGroup: Pearson χ2 for Group model; GCon: G2 for the Conditional model; PCon: Pearson
χ2 for Conditional model.
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Appendix E: Probability Rating Sheet

Judgement Phase 1:

Letter

0

25%

50%

75%

100

0

25%

50%

75%

100

0

25%

50%

75%

100

0

25%

50%

75%

100

0

25%

50%

75%

100

0

25%

50%

75%

100

0

25%

50%

75%

100

0

25%

50%

75%

100

0

25%

50%

75%

100

0

25%

50%

75%

100
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Appendix F: Rank Ordering Sheet

Rank Ordering Judgement 1:

Please rank these 10 letters in order from LOWEST to HIGHEST probability of being
followed by a noise:
V

Z

L

J

B

D

P

G

M

A

Lowest

____

Highest

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____
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Appendix F Letter of Information
Project Title: Individual Differences in Stress and Coping: Testing a Model of
Decisional Control
Principal Investigator: Dr. Richard Neufeld, PhD, Psychology, Western University
Co-investigator: Bryan Grant, BSc, Psychology, Western University

Letter of Information
1. Invitation to Participate
You are being asked to take part in a study investigating how people make
decisions when faced with stressful situations. Discerning how individuals judge
alternatives when faced with a host of aversive events and exert personal control
to minimize the anticipated stress can increase our understanding of the cognitive
underpinnings of stress.
2. Purpose of the Letter
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with information required for you to
make an informed decision regarding participation in this research and stimulate
any questions you may have concerning your participation.
3. Purpose of this Study
Stress is a universally experienced phenomenon, but we have yet to understand
why stress is generated in response to varying situations. How one assesses
stressful situations and the degree to which stress is experienced when control is
limited is the target for this study.
Stress has cognitive, psychophysiological, and behavioural components – thinking
about stressful situations and ways of coping, reacting with physical changes
(heart rate, sweating, muscle agitation, etc), and choosing what to do – all factor
into how stress is experienced and coped with. “Decisional Control” is a method
of coping with stress in which the decision maker chooses to insert himself or
herself into a stressful situation in order to avoid other situations with higher
probabilities of a stressful occurrence. The underlying assumption is that a
decision maker, when faced with a selection of varying levels of adverse events,
will make judgements (a cognitively-intensive process using learned probabilities)
about the stress inherent in each situation and choose available options
accordingly. In other words, when an individual is given a choice, he or she will
attempt to choose the situation with the least likelihood of producing a bad
outcome (with the likelihood being based on previous experience of the bad
outcome happening or not). Deciding which situation is the least likely to produce
the most stress requires some planning and knowledge about the probabilities that
something will go wrong; this, of course, is a thought-intensive process.
One way of conceptualizing and testing this “decisional control” coping strategy
is to use a “game-theoretic approach” whereby stress negotiation is envisioned as
playing a “game” with created scenarios. These scenarios combine to form a
model (a “game-theoretic infrastructure”), that is used to predict how people are
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likely to respond in stressful situations. The model can be thought of as the
“board” and the parameters as the “rules”. Assuming that people are following the
rules and playing using this game-theoretic infrastructure, we are able to predict
the advantageous decisions they would make to achieve the best result. One such
game-theoretic infrastructure has been created by this lab and simulation work has
predicted how people should respond. However, to validate this infrastructure, we
need to know if our predictions align with how people actually respond. Thus, the
intended purposes of this study are as follows:
1) To compare our generated model’s probability predictions to participants’
actual behaviour, in order to see how well the model predictions accurately
describe real responses.
2) To gather data to support this decisional control infrastructure and explore
individual differences in responding to stress. These differences may include
behavioral (e.g., what people select and the time taken to make these selections),
psychophysiological (e.g., heart rate, skin conductance) and subjective measures
(e.g., verbal reports about how stressful making selections was through the use of
numerical ratings).
By empirically gathering data and modelling behavioural, cognitive and
psychophysiological responses to stressful scenarios, we can generate a picture
for how people actually do respond. By further incorporating the use of
psychometric questionnaires (e.g. personality measures, intelligence tests,
preferred methods of coping, etc), individual differences in how decisional control
was applied will create a richer picture of how individuals cope with stress. We
are also interested in how people in a group respond; by combining all the
individual responses, we are able to map out a range of responses that can provide
an idea of how a variety of people in a group might respond. In this way, the
model will be tested not only at an individual level but also at a group level.
4. Inclusion Criteria
Individuals who are under 30 years old, right handed, have no hearing problems
and good English reading comprehension are eligible to participate in this study.
5. Exclusion Criteria
Non-consenting individuals and those who are 30 years old or older, left handed,
having hearing problems or do not have good English reading comprehension are
not eligible to participate in this study.
6. Study Procedures
This experiment includes a questionnaire phase, a learning phase, a practice phase
and a test phase. Before giving consent, you will be briefly exposed to 1 seconds
of white noise calibrated to a maximum of 85 decibels (about the noise of a
subway car 200 feet away). If you have a hearing impairment or sensitivity,
please let the experimenter know, as it is not advisable to continue with the
experiment in this case. Prior to giving and documenting written consent, you will
hear the 1 second sample of white noise, so that you will know what it sounds
like.
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In the first phase of the experiment, you will be asked to complete several
questionnaires about personality, coping, and decision-making. This should take
between 15 and 30 minutes.
For the second phase and third phases, you will be tutored by a set of computer
instructions and learning screens and then asked to practice decision-making tasks
on the computer (a total of about 45 minutes). During the learning phase, you will
learn to associate the probability of a 1 second sample of the white noise, or a
green computer screen, for a set of 10 random letters.
Before beginning the next phase, you will receive a brief introduction to the
experimental apparatus and fitted by a same-sex research assistant (or choose to
apply yourself) with 4 electrodes: one on the neck, one above the ankle, and two
on fingers of your left-hand. Depending on the region and in order to attach these
electrodes, it may be necessary for you to move or lift the collar of your shirt
and/or your pant leg (only during their application and removal of these
electrodes). These electrodes are disposable and are only used for one participant
and discarded. These electrodes are for detecting a signal and are incapable of
delivering a shock.
During the proceeding test phase, the 10 random letters from the learning phase
will be presented again for selection in a computer-driven game-theoretic model.
These trials presented on the computer will be structures with letters arranged on
the bottom that you will have varying amount of control over. You will be asked
to consider the layout of these structures and choose a letter available for
selection. Upon selection of a letter, you will either experience the white-noise or
green-light event based on the probability you learnt in the practice screens. As
such, you will experience brief (1 second) instances of the white noise or green
light again throughout this phase. In consultation with the Department of
Communication Disorders and in keeping with Ontario Ministry of Labour
guidelines, this noise exposure is not considered to be harmful in the short
duration it will be administered for individuals with normal hearing.
The total amount of time involved for completion of the study is about three to
four hours over this 1 session in room 6b of Westminster Hall. You can choose to
take part in the entire session or stop at any particular 30 min (approx.) block.
Please note that you will be compensated on a pro-rated amount based on how
much of the study you complete (see Compensation below). By agreeing to take
part in this study, you will be one of a total of 80 participants.
7. Possible Risks and Harms
Part of the experiment is to present you with minimal discomfort (i.e., brief
exposure to annoying or aversive "white noise”) in order to generate occurrences
of varying levels of stress. However, there are no known physical or
psychological risks involved and such noise is designed not to harm your hearing.
This stimulus is somewhat standard in this type of study and has been used in past
studies in this lab.
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8. Possible Benefits
You may not directly benefit from participating in this study but information
gathered may provide benefits to society as a whole by increasing our
understanding of individual responding in making choices under stress
conditions.
9. Compensation
For those in Psych 1000: You will be compensated up to 4 research credits for
your participation in this study. If you do not complete the entire study you will
still be compensated at a pro-rated amount of 0.5 credit per half hour of
participation.
For those in other courses with a research component: You will be compensated
according to the criteria set forth on your course syllabus. Please consult your
specific course outline for details of your compensation.
10. Voluntary Participation
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, refuse to
answer any questions or withdraw from the study at any time with no effect on
your future academic status and without loss of promised pro-rated compensation.
11. Confidentiality
All data collected, which will be stored by code (and not by name) to protect
your privacy, will remain confidential and accessible only to the investigators of
this study. The coded data will be stored on a computer hard drive, an external
hard drive, and in a locked cabinet all within locked offices. The list of
participants' names with their corresponding codes will be stored in a separate
locked place. If the results are published, your name will not be used. If you
choose to withdraw from this study, your data will be removed and destroyed
from our database. All data will be destroyed five years after publication. While
we will do our best to protect your information there is no guarantee that we
will be able to do so. The inclusion of your initials and your age (years and
months) may allow someone to link the data and identify you.
12. Contacts for Further Information
If you require any further information regarding this research project or your
participation in the study you may contact Dr. Neufeld in Room 310,
Westminster Hall, or Bryan Grant, 225 Westminster Hall (ext. 84682,
bgrant29@uwo.ca). If you have any questions about your rights as a research
participant or the conduct of this study, you may contact The Office of Research
Ethics (519) 661-3036, email: ethics@uwo.ca.
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13. Publication
In publication of results of the study, your name will not be used. If you would
like to receive a copy of any potential study results, please provide your name
and contact information on the sheet entitled Consent to Contact with Results
included in this package.

This letter is yours to keep for future reference.
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Consent Form
Project Title: Individual Differences in Stress and Coping: Testing a Model
of Decisional Control
Study Investigator’s Name: Dr. Richard Neufeld, PhD, Psychology,
Western University
I have read the Letter of Information, have had the nature of the study
explained to me and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered
to my satisfaction.
Participant’s Name (please print):

Participant’s Signature:

________________________________________

_______________________________________________

Date:
_______________________________________________

Person Obtaining Informed Consent (please print): _____________________________

Signature:____________________________

Date:
_____________________________
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Appendix G: SONA Outline
Project Title: Individual Differences in Stress and Coping: Testing a Model of
Decisional Control
Principal Investigator: Dr. Richard Neufeld, PhD, Psychology, Western University
Co-investigator: Bryan Grant, BSc, Psychology, Western University
SONA template:
In this study, you will be asked to complete a number of personality questionnaires and a
decision making computer task (where you will make selections based on several choices
available). During the computer task, you will have psychophysiological-measuring
electrodes attached by a same-sex research assistant to your neck, breastbone, and upper
and lower rib cage. As such, we ask that you wear a loose, short-sleeved shirt when you
attend the testing session; this will enable the same-sex research assistant to attach the
electrodes without needing you to remove your shirt entirely. To generate some stress in
completing the decision making computer task, you will experience quick, one second
bursts of loud noise (roughly equivalent to a passing subway car) throughout the study
based on a combination of probability and performance. Please note, that the use of this
noise is kept at safe levels and with a total length well below what is advised by Ontario’s
Ministry of Labour guidelines for exposure in loud environments.
The study will take between 3 and 4 hours (based on how long you would like to
participate) and will take place in Westminster Hall Room 6b. If you are a Psychology
1000 student, you will receive 0.5 credits toward your Psychology 1000 research
participation option for each half hour of the study.
In order to participate in this study, you must be right handed, have good reading
comprehension and are younger than 30 years old.
If you have any questions about the study, please contact Bryan Grant at
bgrant29@uwo.ca
Please note: your participation is voluntary and all information collected will be kept
confidential.

68

Email correspondence:
Subject Line: Invitation to participate in research
You are being invited to participate in a study that explores the physiological and
behavioural effects of stress on decision making. This email is a courtesy message briefly
detailing the study before you come in for your selected session time in Westminster Hall
6b. During this meeting you will go over the letter of information, establish consent and
complete the study if you choose to consent. This is a reminder that you are able to take
part in the study only if you are right handed, have good reading comprehension and are
younger than 30 years old.
The study can take between 3 and 4 hours to complete and its length is based on how
many blocks of the experiment you would like to complete. For participating in the study,
you will receive credits towards your course requirements on a prorated amount based on
the amount of the study that has been completed. For example, if you are in Psych 1000,
you will receive half a credit for every half an hour of the study you complete up to a
total of 4 credits. For other courses, please see your course syllabus for criteria on how
you will receive credits for participation.
In the study, you will required to complete a number of personality questionnaires (on
how you respond to stressful/anxiety provoking situations) and a decision making
computer task (where you will make selections based on several choices available).
During the computer task, you will have psychophysiological-measuring electrodes
attached by a same-sex research assistant to your neck, breastbone, and upper and lower
rib cage. As such, we ask that you wear a loose, short-sleeved shirt when you attend the
testing session as this will enable the same-sex research assistant to attach the electrodes
without needing you to remove your shirt entirely. To generate some stress in completing
the decision making computer task, you will experience quick, one second bursts of loud
noise (roughly equivalent to a passing subway car) throughout the study based on
combination of probability and performance. Please note, that the use of this noise is
kept at safe levels and with a total length well below what is advised by Ontario’s
Ministry of Labour guidelines to exposure for loud environments.
To aid you in finding the testing room, a research assistant will you meet you in the main
lobby of Westminster Hall a few minutes before your testing session.
If you have any further questions about the study, do not hesitate to ask them in a reply to
this email.
Thank you,Dr. Richard Neufeld

Bryan Grant

Western University

Western University

rneufeld@uwo.ca

bgrant29@uwo.ca

519-661-3696
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Appendix H: Debriefing Sheet
Project Title: Individual Differences in Stress and Coping: Testing a Model of
Decisional Control
Principal Investigator: Dr. Richard Neufeld, PhD, Psychology, Western University
Co-investigator: Bryan Grant, BSc, Psychology, Western University
Decisional Coping Experimental Debrief Sheet
This study you have just participated in was concerned with how people react
when under the effects of stress. Coping with stress is a universal experience and,
undoubtedly, one that requires a complex interplay of cognitive functions. Coping with
stress can be done in a variety of ways, but choice is key in determining how an
individual will respond (Averill, 1973). Through behavioural, cognitive and decisional
means, choice in stressful situations offers an advantage of accessing less-threatening
alternatives and greater control of reducing stress reactions (Averill, 1973).
Decisional Control is a method of coping with stress in which the decision maker
positions “oneself in a stressor situation so as to avoid situational components harboring
higher probabilities of stress” (Lees & Neufeld, 1999, p. 185) from a physically or
socially adverse event. The underlying assumption is that a decision maker, when faced
with a selection of varying levels of adverse events, will make probabilistic judgements
(a cognitively-intensive process) about the stress inherent in each situation and make a
choice to pursue the option they believe has the lowest associated level of stress.
The paradigm you completed on the computer was one in which decisional
control was conceptualized and tested through a game-theoretic approach whereby stress
negotiation is cast as playing a game with the environment, the goal of which is to
maximize well-being or safety. The stressor used in the experiment was the
administration of loud white noise. You were presented with choices involving selection
of letters that represented a threat level. Selections varied to some extent in the degree to
which they were controllable (i.e., sometimes you were given only one selection and
other times you were allowed to make your own choice).
The first aim of this study is to test this game-theoretic infrastructure upon which
a mathematical model (technically a probability mixture model) was built. Such an
infrastructure (or representative environmental framework) would allow us to develop
precise likelihoods of stress-relevant events and test our model at both an individual and
group level. If our model predictions align with empirical observations, the model could
be adapted for use in future studies with clinical populations with known cognitive and
decisional difficulties. This could allow theoretical exploration and interpretation of
aberrant or dysfunctional cognition leading to suboptimal, cognition dependant coping
strategies in these groups.
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In order to quantify and empirically test this environmental framework of
decisional control and explore individual differences in responding, behavioural (e.g.,
choice selection and their latencies), psychophysiological (e.g., heart rate, skin
conductance, facial muscle responses) and subjective measures (e.g., verbal reports,
numerical ratings) of stress were collected from you. Past research has supported the use
of these empirical measures quantifying decisional control composition (reviewed in
Shanahan & Neufeld, 2010).
The second aim of this study is to explore how people differ in the way in which
they react to similar situations. That is, not all people find controllable situations to be
less stressful than uncontrollable situations. In fact, some people may actually find
controllable situations to be more stressful than uncontrollable ones. This study was
designed to examine the preferences people have about the different kinds of stressful
situations they might find themselves in indicative of their decisional coping style. The
model will be further augmented with individual-difference psychometric analyses
(participants competing personality measures) to explore individual aptitude differences
in application of decisional control. The resultant findings will give rise to new modeltesting predictions including how individuals use decisional control to varying degrees in
making decisions.
If you find you are having trouble managing stress in your own life, or have been
upset by anything in particular during this experiment, please let the experimenter know.
Two counseling resources available for students include the:
Student Development Centre, Western Student Services Building, Suite 4100, 519661-3031, www.sdc.uwo.ca
Student Health Services, UCC Rm 11 (basement), 519-661-3030, www.shs.uwo.ca
If you have any questions about the experiment which were not answered during
or after the experiment itself, feel free to contact Bryan Grant, Rm 225 Westminster Hall,
519-661-2111 ext. 84682, bgrant29@uwo.ca or Prof. Richard W.J. Neufeld, Rm. 310,
Westminster Hall, Phone: 661-3696. If you have questions about your rights as a research
participant, you should contact the Director of the Office of Research Ethics at
ethics@uwo.ca, or 519-661-3036.

Thank you very much for your participation.
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Appendix J: Hierarchal Structures Presented During Testing
Note: The eight letters presented at the bin level were completely randomized each trial
and random, static letters are presented below for example purposes.
CC:

In a CC condition, participants have information and control at both the bin and element
level. They can select any letter within either group.
CU:

In a CU condition, participants have information and control at the element level, but
neither control or information at the bin level. They can select either group (pressing 1 or
2), but a letter at random within that group is assigned to them.
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CN:

In a CN condition, participants have information and control at the element level, and
only information at the bin level. They can only select the letter indicated within each
group.
UC:

In a UC condition, participants have neither information or control at the bin level, but
have information and control at the element level. They can select any letter in either
group. Once they have made their selection, the group from which they selected would
have its colours fade, indicating that no further selections are available from this group.
In the example above, let us assume J was selected in the first group. The participants
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would then make a letter selection from the other group (P for example) and the letter
assigned would be randomly chosen between both letter selections (50-50 chance of
either J or P). This is indicative of the participants having either group assigned to them
at random, with no information nor control.
UU:

In a UU condition, participants have neither information or control at the bin or element
levels. They can select any letter, but are assigned one of the eight randomly.
UN:
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In a UN condition, participants have neither information or control at the bin level and
only information at the element level. They can select each letter indicated within each
group and are assigned either at random.
NC:

In a NC condition, participants have information, but not control at the bin level and
information and control at the element level. They can select any letter within the group
indicated as accessible, but are not able to select letters from the other group.
NU:

In a NU condition, participants have only information at the element level and neither
information or control at the bin level. They can select any letter within the group
indicated, but the letter assigned to them is random within that group.
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NN:

In a NN condition, participants have only information at both the element and bin levels.
They can only select the letter indicated to them.
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